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Abstract
We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs.
This question is tackled within the framework of Principal–Agent problems in presence of adverse selection. The
particular features of electricity induce an unusual structure on the production cost, with no decreasing return to
scale. We are nevertheless able to provide an explicit solution for the problem at hand. The optimal contracts are
either linear or polynomial with respect to the consumption. Whenever the outside options offered by competitors
are not uniform among the different type of consumers, we exhibit situations where the electricity provider should
contract with consumers with either low or high appetite for electricity.
Key words: electricity pricing, adverse selection, power management, contract theory, u−convexity, calculus of
variations.
AMS 2000 subject classifications: 91B08; 91B69; 49L20.
1 Introduction
Electricity is non–storable, except marginally: any quantity which is consumed now must be produced now, and
conversely. This means that the installed capacity must be sufficient to supply electricity when demand is maximal.
As a consequence, part of this installed capacity will stay idle when demand is lower. This is the overcapacity
problem, which is compounded by the fact that electricity consumption is far from stable, and little substitutable.
People turn the heating on when it is cold, and the air conditioning on when it is warm, they turn the light on as
soon as it gets dark and the home appliances when they come back from work. Unless they own a generator, there
is no other source of energy they can turn to. So the collective demand for electricity must be satisfied, and satisfied
right now.
Since there are no stocks to dampen shocks and smooth discrepancy, adjusting supply to demand is a difficult task.
One way to do this is to use prices. Very early on, power companies have hit upon the idea of making electricity more
expensive in peak hours, so that consumers who are able to do so would switch their demand to off–peak periods.
This falls naturally within the framework of Principal–Agent problems: the Principal (here the power company) offers
a variety of contracts, and each Agent (consumer) picks the one which suits him best. It does not seem, however,
that such an analysis is available at the present time, and the aim of the present paper is to fill this gap.
We focus on the problem of finding an appropriate tariff: for a given installed capacity, or rather, for a given
production function, how should a power company price electricity in order to maximise its profit? The company
faces a variety of consumers, industrial users and domestic users, some of them are efficient, others less so. Some of
them, for instance, live in insulated homes and need less electricity to achieve comfortable temperatures than others.
The tariff the producer offers will be time–dependent and consumption–based. It will act in several ways:
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• it will redirect part of the consumers to off-peak periods, by pricing properly the peak hours,
• it will avoid overly expensive production costs, by penalising higher consumptions,
• it will effectively exclude some of the users, who will find the proposed tariff too expensive, and who will look
for better alternatives elsewhere.
The empirical effective response of individual agents to hourly pricing contracts is studied in [3] or [11] and is
heterogeneous among the electricity consumers, as pointed out in [19] or [22]. Besides, more resilient measures of
high electricity prices appear to be more efficient in practice for incentivising the reduction of electricity consumption,
see [21] or [42]. In any case, the critical importance of the feedback information signals provided to the Agent has
been highlighted in the empirical literature [12, 13, 14]. In particular, the development of smart metering systems
allows for the implementation of decentralised home automation systems, who partially regulate power consumption,
as presented e.g. in [1] or [27]. The adoption of dynamic electricity tariffs is also proven to be heterogeneous among
the population [25, 30, 17]. In our model, we encompass this feature by considering that the consumers have outside
options to the contract, such as swapping for a competitor or to alternative sources of energy, which provide them
reservation utilities, which depend of the particular characteristics of each client. These characteristics are summed
up in a type, which is private information of each client, leading to an adverse selection problem for the company.
The heterogeneity of fallback options also stresses out the effect of competitors on the energy retailer market, whose
impact is discussed in [23] or [38].
We frame the problem in a Principal–Agent model, in which the power company proposes a contract, that is, a
tariff, and the consumers either turn down the contract and drop out, or accept it, and adjust their consumption
accordingly. Electricity pricing has a special feature, which distinguishes it from other Principal–Agent problems.
Usually, the profit of the Principal is the sum of the profits she gets from all participating Agents. Here, the cost to
the power plant is the cost of producing the aggregate demand, which is not the sum of the costs of producing the
individual demands, because of decreasing returns to scale in production. This introduces a mathematical difficulty
which is not treated frequently in the literature and has deep consequences on the tariff. There are actually earlier
works in a bilevel optimisation setting, where only linear pricing is considered, see for example [20] where the question
is to provide electricity and to sponsor at the same time saving measures, or [2] where consumers can reduce their
consumption at a price of inconvenience. As a related study, we mention as well the Principal–Agent modelling
discussed in [15] for reducing energy consumption in a landlord–tenant relationship.
Instead of putting an upper bound on production, we consider a production function with steeply increasing marginal
cost, as discussed for example in [9]. In reality, the capacity constraint is not binding: more electricity can always
be found, by putting in service less efficient production units, or by resorting to the spot market. It only becomes
extremely expensive when the limits are pushed. The production function can be understood either as reflecting
the actual cost of producing electricity from primary energies, in which case the power company is a producer, or
the financial cost of buying electricity on the open market, in which case the power company is a retailer, or a
combination of both.
Increasing marginal costs are considered in [39], where in a similar model to ours, the profit–maximising direct
revelation mechanism is found, along with different pricing strategies implementing it. In our work, however, we
do not aim at finding a menu of tariffs, but instead a single one which is offered to all the clients. For this reason
our methodology, which is described below, departs from the usual analysis of multi–dimensional screening, such as
[4, 32, 33, 34]. We are able to solve the problem at hand in the present paper explicitly, in some polar cases. The
tariff we find is quite natural. It consists in the sum of three components
• A fixed component, independent of the consumption, which is a subscription to the service.
• A linear component in consumption, which consists simply of pricing the current consumption at the current price.
Recall that the price depends on time in order to discourage peak–hour consumption.
• A non–linear component on the current consumption. This part appears only when the consumption is high
enough. Its purpose is to make the high consumers pay for making the Principal produce at very high marginal
cost.
In Principal–Agent models, one is used to the fact that the optimal contract for the Principal will exclude the low
end of the market, that is, the least efficient Agents. Indeed, such shutdown contracts are quite commonplace in the
adverse selection literature, see for instance the seminal papers of Guesnerie and Laffont [16] or Rochet and Choné
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[34] in discrete–time (see also the monograph by Laffont and Martimort for more details [26]), or the more recent
contributions of Cvitanić et al. [7] and Hernández Santibáñez et al. [18] in continuous–time. A remarkable feature
of our problem is that, in certain circumstances, the optimal contract excludes the high end of the market: the most
efficient agents, those who need less electricity to achieve the same degree of welfare than others, go elsewhere, and
only the least efficient ones remain. This corresponds to situations of Cournot competition, where the welfare gain
associated with increase in electricity consumption is small beyond a certain point (as in the case of domestic users:
one does not need to heat or cool too much), so that the welfare is sensitive to price and not to consumption. In
that case it becomes worthwhile not to take part in that competition, which concerns the most efficient Agents, and
to concentrate on the least efficient ones, who are still a long way from achieving saturation, and who are more
sensitive to changes in consumption. Exclusion of agents other than the least efficient ones can be found in models
with countervailing incentives (see [28]). In [24] and [29], it may be optimal to exclude intermediate agents from the
contract, which is also the case in our model.
We now proceed to describe the main features of our model. The Principal’s cost, as mentioned above, is a convex
function of aggregate production. She offers a contract to the Agents, who may accept or decline it. If they accept,
they commit for a period T > 0. They decline if the total utility they derive from the contract is less than the
reservation utility corresponding to their type. The Agents’ utilities are separable: the utility which an agent of type
x derives from consuming a quantity c of electricity at time t and being charged a (nonlinear) price p is
u(t, x, c)− p(c),
where u(t, x, ·) is a concave function of c. This separability assumption is traditional in Principal–Agent problems. In
this case, there are additional justifications, as a large part of the Agents are industrial users, who consume electricity
in order to produce other goods, so that their utility simply identifies to the profit they derive from this activity.
Note also the time–dependence, which reflects the seasonality of consumption.
In the sequel, we will consider CRRA utilities, of the type γ−1cγ , with γ < 1, and we will provide explicit solutions
(except in the case γ = 0, or u(c) = ln c). The case γ < 0 reflects the "household" behaviour, where electricity fulfils
some basic needs, such as lighting or appliances, and 0 consumption is not acceptable, while high consumption is
not needed. The case 0 < γ < 1 reflects the "industrial" behaviour, where high consumption is the norm, subject to
decreasing returns to scale. Note, however, that in both cases there is a "fallback" option, a substitute to electricity
when it becomes too expensive, for instance an alternative energy source, or simply another provider. This fallback
option is expressed by a reservation utility, which may be constant or vary across Agents. Despite the particular
structure of the cost function, we are able to solve explicitly the problem at hand. We observe that the optimal
contract rewrites as the combination of a fixed cost together with two variable costs, proportional to either the
electricity consumption or a power function of it. This tariff structure happens to be quite simple and quite close to
the classical tariff structures offered by most electricity providers.
Whenever the fallback option is the same for every Agent, we observe as usual in Principal–Agent problems, that the
lower end of the market is not covered: the low types (meaning those households who are less dependent on electricity,
or those industry users who are less efficient) will not be offered contracts which they are willing to accept, and will
have to fall back on the outside option. More interestingly, we are also able to solve explicitly the case where the
fallback option of the Agents depends on their type in a concave manner. In this case, getting more efficient Agents
can be too costly, and the electricity provider may concentrate on the less efficient but less expensive consumers.
Finally, a remark on the mathematics. We will be using u−convex analysis, a tool which has been introduced and
developed elsewhere, notably by Carlier (see e.g. [6]), and which extends classical convex analysis. The economic
interpretation of the mathematical formulas is straightforward. Forgetting for ease of presentation about time
dependence, assume Agent x has the separable utility u(x, c)−p(c), as described above, and let the Principal set out
a price schedule p(c). The maximal utility Agent x derives from this price schedule is
max
c
{u(x, c)− p(c)} .
This number is denoted by p?(x), and called the indirect utility of Agent x. Note that it depends on the entire
price schedule and it can be computed for each Agent x. In this way, we associate with each function p(c) a function
p?(x), which the economist knows as the indirect utility associated with p and which the mathematician knows as the
u−conjugate or u−transform of p. Conversely, if the indirect utility p? is known, the price schedule can be derived
by the same formula
p(c) = max
x
{u(x, c)− p?(x)} .
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In the bilinear case, when u(x, c) = xc, we get the usual Fenchel formulas of convex analysis.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the model and the main results, i.e. the expression
of the tariffs for industrial and residential customers. In Section 3 we provide economic interpretation of numerical
results. In Section 4, we provide a rigorous definition of the model, from the mathematical point of view. Sections 5
and 6 provide the main results for constant and concave increasing reservation utility; proofs are left for appendixes.
Finally, the conclusions are given in Section 7.
2 Main results
The model we propose is set up on Principal–Agent relationship where the Principal is an electricity provider and the
Agents are electricity consumers. Since the electricity consumption is observed by the Principal, there is no moral
hazard. On the other hand, adverse selection is in force since the Agents’ willingness to pay for electricity is not
known by the Principal. This taste for electricity represents how much Agents price a given volume of electricity
in terms of usefulness. For an industrial Agent, this would represent the benefit he gets by running his industrial
process with this given volume of electricity. For a residential Agent, this would represent the comfort he gets by
using this given volume of electricity to perform domestic tasks. Of course, this depends on the efficiency of the
Agents’ equipment, referred to as his type X. As classically assumed in adverse selection setting, even if the Principal
does not know the exact type of a particular Agent, he knows the repartition of Agents’ type among the population.
This hypothesis is realistic as the electricity provider can always make surveys in order to acquire such information.
2.1 Players’ objectives and electricity particularity
Both players have their particular objectives
• Agent’s objective is to choose the level of electricity consumption c at any time t, which maximisez his utility
for electricity u (t, x, c) with respect to his type x, minus the tariff p(t, c) that he needs to pay for the electricity
consumed
max
c
{∫ T
0
u (t, x, c)− p (t, c) dt
}
.
• Principal’s objective is to offer the tariffs which maximise his own profits: all payments she receives from consumers
accepting the contract minus the costs for providing the total volume of electricity consumed by her clients. The
provider can offer power either by buying on the electricity market or by producing it herself.
One particular feature of electricity production, is the fact that it suffers from decreasing returns to scale: its marginal
price increases with the total aggregate consumption. This comes from the fact that several technologies can be used
in order to produce electricity. Some power plants have no or very low fuel costs such as renewables (hydro power
plants, wind or solar production) or nuclear production. These types of productions are chosen for satisfying base–
load consumption. But when, the electricity consumption increases such as in peak hours, other power plants (coal,
gas or fuel thermal plants for example) need to be turned on and their cost of production is much more expensive.
The electricity spot price shows this strong base/peak patterns and can exhibit high spikes when capacity productions
reach their limit with respect to consumption. For this reason, we impose in our model that the electricity production
cost of the Principal depends on the consumption of all her clients.
2.2 Notations and model assumptions
We consider constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions for the Agents
u(t, x, c) = gγ(x)φ(t)
cγ
γ
,
where φ(t) represents the Agents’ time preference for electricity. This factor is common to every Agent and typically
represents the preference to have electricity during the daytime than during the middle of the night. We suppose
that γ < 1 and we consider two different cases: γ ∈ (0, 1) and γ < 0. The function gγ represents the willingness of
the Agents to pay for their consumption depending on their type x, and we take typically gγ(x) = x, if γ ∈ (0, 1)
and gγ(x) = 1− x, if γ < 0. Graphic illustrations of the utility function are shown in Figure 1. The case γ ∈ (0, 1)
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corresponds to the modelling of industrial Agents, whose utility grows to infinity if they can have infinite volume
of electricity: they can always make their industrial capacities grow and generate more benefits whenever they have
extra electricity. On the contrary, they can stop producing if they could not get any electricity or substitute it by
another energy, which corresponds to a zero utility whenever c = 0. The case γ < 0 illustrates the residential Agents
utility for whom electricity is a staple product: they can not avoid consuming electricity (they would get −∞ utility).
They also face a saturation effect: above a high volume of electricity, they do not gain much satisfaction with an
extra quantity, because all their electrical needs are already fulfilled.
γ ∈ (0, 1) γ < 0
Figure 1: Agent’s utility with respect to consumption for γ ∈ (0, 1) (left figure) and γ < 0 (right figure).
The probability density function of the types is know by the Principal and denoted by f . The indirect utility P ?(x)
is the best level of utility that an Agent of type x can obtain by signing the contract, which is put into place during
the period [0, T ]
P ?(x) :=
∫ T
0
p?(t, x)dt = sup
c
{∫ T
0
u(t, x, c)− p(t, c)dt
}
.
The tariffs designed by the Principal need to respect the individual rationality of the Agents. Indeed, Agents are not
forced to accept the contract offered by the Principal, since they can pick alternative electricity providers, offering
better conditions. This is taken into account in the model via a reservation utility H which represents the minimum
level of satisfaction that an Agent needs to achieve in order to accept the contract. This reservation utility can be
interpreted as an aggregation of competitors’ offers or as a minimum level of utility imposed by public services, who
offer a regulated tariff.
Agent of type x signs the contract with the Principal if and only if P ?(x) ≥ H(x). We consider two cases for H(x),
either a constant function or a concave one verifying that the elasticity of reservation utility is smaller than the the
elasticity of willingness to pay for consumption, i.e. gγ/g′γ ≤ H/H ′. The concavity of H indicates that competitors
target principally the more efficient Agents. We denote by X? the set of Agents who end up signing the contract
X?(p) := {x ∈ [0, 1], P ?(x) ≥ H(x)} .
Finally, as mentioned before, the cost of production depends on the set X?(p). By disregarding a dependancy of the
production costs on the consumption of all the population, we are implicitly assuming that aggregate consumption
of clients who select the provider is correlated to the consumption of all the other consumers. This is justified since
there are strong common preferences and behaviours among consumers, for example consumptions are higher during
daytime than during the night. We assume finally a convex cost of power production K
K(t, c) = k(t)
cn
n
.
The term k(t) is positive and indicates the time dependence of electricity production costs (for example photovoltaic
production occurs only at day and wind is blowing more during winter). The power n > 1 reflects the production
fleet composition; the fleet has expensive peak power plants when n is high.
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2.3 Optimal tariffs
In the setting we previously described, the Principal–Agent problem can be explicitly solved. We present in this part
only a brief sketch of the argumentation and rigorous mathematical proofs are postponed to the remaining sections
of the paper. Let us stress out that the problem is solved without imposing any a priori structure of the tariff
function, except that it only depends on time and consumption. In order to be admissible, a tariff p should verify
the individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions. This is denoted by p ∈ P. Let us write formally
the objective function of the Agents UA and Principal UP
UA(p, x) := sup
c
∫ T
0
(u(t, x, c(t))− p(t, c(t))) dt =
∫ T
0
p?(t, x)dt.
UP := sup
p∈P
∫ T
0
[∫
X?(p?)
p(t, c?(t, x))f(x)dx−K
(
t,
∫
X?(p?)
c?(t, x)f(x)dx
)]
dt.
The proof is performed into five main steps:
• For a given tariff p, the optimal responding consumption of the Agents can be determined as a function of ∂p?∂x .
This is injected in the Principal’s problem, which is now expressed only in terms of p?.
• In order to solve the problem of the Principal, we first consider an alternative problem U˜P , which is simpler to
solve, where we relax one of the mathematical constraints which is difficult to handle.
• The structure of X? is determined. Whenever H is constant, it is proven that X? is of the form [a0, 1] meaning
only the most efficient Agents select the contract. Whenever H is concave, X? is of the form [0, b0] ∪ [a0, 1],
meaning that the Principal may also select the less efficient Agents.
• Knowing the structure of X?, we rewrite the problem of the Principal as a finite–dimensional function of a0
and b0. The maximum of this function can be determined by standard optimisation techniques.
• We finally verify whether the solution p? for the alternative problem satisfies indeed the conditions of the initial
problem, i.e., it is admissible. By doing so, we are able to conclude that the solutions of both problems coincide
and it is given by p?.
We compute that, whatever γ or H (constant or concave), the optimal tariff is a function of three components at
most, namely a constant part p3, a proportional part p2 of the consumed power c, and a proportional part p1 of cγ
p(t, c) = p1(t)c
γ + p2(t)c+ p3(t).
This tariff is always a concave increasing function of the consumed power c. An important observation is that
this tariff is quite simple and close to current tariff structures proposed by electricity providers. Indeed, they are
commonly split into a fixed charge in e, a volumetric charge in e/MWh, and possibly a demand charge in e/MW.
The fixed and the volumetric charges can depend on the maximum subscribed power which is another way to price
the demand charge. The optimal tariffs the Principal offers in our settings are summarised in the following tables,
where the explicit expressions for the functions (pi,γ)i, (p
j
i )i,j and cˆ
γ
i (t) are respectively provided in Theorem 5.2 and
Theorem 6.3 hereafter.
Selected Agents H constant H concave non decreasing
[a0, 1] most effective Agents p2,γ(t)c+ p3,γ(t) p
1
2,γ(t)c+ p
1
3,γ(t), for c < cˆ
γ
1(t)
[b0, a0] intermediate Agents not picked not picked
[0, b0] least effective Agents not picked p31,γ(t)cγ + p32,γ(t)c+ p33,γ(t), for cˆ
γ
2(t) < c
Selected Agents H constant H concave non decreasing
[a0, 1] most effective Agents p1,γ(t)c
γ + p2,γ(t)c+ p3,γ(t) p
1
1,γ(t)c
γ + p12,γ(t)c+ p
1
3,γ(t), for c > cˆ
γ
2(t)
[b0, a0] intermediate Agents not picked not picked
[0, b0] least effective Agents not picked p32,γ(t)c+ p33,γ(t), for c < cˆ
γ
1(t)
Table 1: Optimal tariff of residential consumers γ < 0 (top), and industrial consumers γ ∈ (0, 1) (bottom).
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Let us interpret the optimal tariffs and connect the three components to electricity pricing standard issues. Clearly,
p3 represents the fixed charge. The volumetric charge is the combination of a standard term p2(t)c plus p1(t)cγ , where
the latter is a way to charge more high demand consumers (indeed it only appears when c is high enough). Finally, no
explicit demand charge appears but the coefficients (pi)1≤i≤3 depend on the maximum subscribed power (cˆ
γ
i )1≤i≤3,
which limits the instantaneous power use and allows to charge more high power consumers. Let us point out that
this method of electricity pricing is implementable in practice, thanks to the recent spread and development of smart
meters, which enables a precise metering of electricity consumption, and a dynamic management of maximum power1.
In addition, the peak/off–peak issues are handled by the temporal structure of the tariff and high power consumption
within peak period will be overcharged compared to off–peak period. Let us also mention that the proportional part
p1(t) to cγ only depends on the Agent’s utility parameters. Therefore this part should be common to any Principal,
whatever her cost of production is, or the reservation utility of the consumers.
The selected Agents are the most efficient when H is constant, which is a classical result. But whenever H is concave,
the Principal can also select Agents among the least efficient ones. Indeed, in this case reaching most efficient Agents
is costly and it happens that getting less efficient Agents can be profitable as they are easily satisfied. This type of
feature seems to be uncommon in the Principal–Agent literature and can only be found, as far as we know, in models
with countervailing incentives.
3 Economic interpretations and numerical results
3.1 Examples when H is constant
For a constant reservation utility, most efficient Agents are selected. We present numerical illustrations in Figure 2.
The tariff structure is linear with the consumption when γ < 0 and is concave when γ ∈ (0, 1), which is represented
in the upper graphics of Figure 2. Middle graphics represent the utility Agents can obtain by signing the contract,
depending on their type. If this utility level is smaller than their reservation utility (represented by the dashed line)
they do not enter the contract and their consumption is null, as represented in the lower graphics. These utility
representations also illustrate a classical result of informational rent: the most efficient Agents obtain a tariff inferior
to what they are willing to pay, whereas the less efficient ones need to pay as much as they are able to, or are
excluded.
3.2 Examples when H is concave
For a concave reservation utility, not only most efficient Agents are selected. We provide numerical illustrations
where either the most or the least efficient Agents are selected on Figure 3. First, let us analyse the example when
H(x) =
√
x and γ ∈ (0, 1), which corresponds to the left column. In this example, only the most efficient Agents
sign the contract as they are the only ones obtaining a higher utility than their reservation one. As presented in
the previous section, the tariff structure is the combination of three functions of consumption (upper graphics), but
Agents who sign the contract only choose consumption such that cˆγ2 < c which corresponds to the concave tariff part
p1(t)
3cγ + p32(t)c+ p
3
3(t).
When H(x) = log (x) and γ < 0 (right column of Figure 3), only less efficient Agents take the contract. Indeed, the
concavity of the reservation utility makes it profitable for the Principal to select these Agents, rather than the most
efficient ones. The tariff structure is again the combination of three functions of consumption (upper graphics) but
Agents who sign the contract in this example only take consumption such that cˆγ2 < c (of course cˆ2 is different from
the one in the previous example because we consider a different H). This again corresponds to the concave tariff
part p1(t)3cγ + p32(t)c+ p33(t).
3.3 Impact of competition when H is constant
When H increases because competition is more intense, the Principal adapts her tariff in order to remain competitive.
In that case, the Principal mainly decreases the constant part p3,γ of the tariff in order to attract consumers (see
the left graphic of Figure 5 when γ < 0). The consumers selecting this new tariff obtain better conditions and as
such consume more power, because it is cheaper, see the same example on the left graphic of Figure 4 when γ < 0.
1See for instance the USmartConsumer report [40], which states that at the end of 2016, 30% of overall European electricity meters
were equipped with smart technology
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Figure 2: Tariffs paid against consumption (upper graphs), Agents’ utility against type (middle graphs), selected
consumption against Agents’ type (lower graphs); H constant.
Figure 3: Tariffs against consumption (upper graphs), Agents’s utility against type (middle graphs), and selected
consumption against types (lower graphs); H concave.
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Therefore, when the Principal decreases his tariff, he does not decrease it enough in order to keep the same quantity
of consumers: he accepts to retain less of them, but the selected ones do consume more, as represented on the right
graphic of Figure 4. Nevertheless, the utility of the Principal decreases with competition, see the right part of Figure
5. At the extreme, the Principal even offers no tariff whenever H is too high. Observe that in this example, the fixed
part of the tariff represents more than a half of the total cost of electricity for the consumers.
Figure 4: Evolution of Agents’ utility (left) and consumption (right) against type; H increases and γ < 0.
Figure 5: Evolution of tariff’s components (left) and Principal utility UP (right); H increases and γ < 0.
3.4 Impact of cost of production when H is constant
For an increase of the cost of production k, the Principal also adapts his tariff in order to reflect this cost modification.
In that case, the Principal mainly increases the proportional part p2,γ of its tariff, see the example for constant H
and γ < 0 on the left part of Figure 7. Consumers who select this new tariff are offered worse conditions, and as such
consume less power, because it is more expensive, see the same example on the left graphic of Figure 6. In addition,
less consumers select the contract. Therefore, the utility of the Principal decreases with the cost of production, as
illustrated in the right part of Figure of 7. On the contrary, some production technologies like renewable have no
9
variable production costs and only fixed costs which corresponds mainly to the investment and the maintenance
costs. If we imagine a system with a very large share of these types of technology, the variable cost k could be very
low: energy is not expensive only the installation of equipment is costly. In that case, the proportional part p2 goes
to zero. This means that for residential consumers (γ < 0), the electricity tariff would reduce only to a fixed charge
(see illustration on figure 7) and consumers would pay the same whatever their consumption. But their consumption
is "naturally" limited by the saturation for electricity expressed in their utility function. For industrial Agents
(γ ∈ [0, 1]), the electricity tariff would reduce to a fixed charge p3 and to a proportional part p1 of cγ . Therefore,
this is this last term which enables to limit the consumption for industrial Agents.
Figure 6: Agents’ utility (left) and consumption (right) against type; k increases and γ < 0.
Figure 7: Tariff’s components (left) and Principal utility UP (right) against k; γ < 0.
Let us also point out that we can simulate the impact of the convexity of the cost of production K and this shows
that the structure of the optimal tariff is unchanged when n→ 1.
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4 Model specification
We now turn to a more precise exposition of the model and try to present it in a rather general setting. We will state
the main ideas and methodologies in the highest level of generality. Specific assumptions on the shape on the utility,
type distribution or cost functions will only be introduced later, in order to present our results in a more explicit
fashion.
In this model, the Principal is a power company, whose purpose is to offer to its clients a collection of tariffs which
maximise its profits. The time horizon T > 0 is fixed. The following notations are used throughout the article.
• C represents the admissible levels of consumption for the Agents, and it is either equal to R+ or R∗+ depending
on the utility function of the Agents.
• p : [0, T ]×C −→ R+ is the tariff proposed by the Principal, such that p(t, c) represents the instantaneous price
of electricity at time t corresponding to a level of consumption c.
• K : [0, T ] × C −→ R+ is the cost of production of electricity for the Principal, such that K(t, c) represents
the cost at time t for an aggregate level of production c. We assume that K is continuous in t, increasing,
continuously differentiable and strictly convex in c.
• x is the Agent’s type, assumed to take values in some subset X of R.
• c : [0, T ]×X −→ C is the consumption function, such that c(t, x) represents the consumption of electricity by
an Agent of type x at time t.
• u : [0, T ]×X ×C −→ R is the utility function of the Agents, such that u(t, x, c) represents the utility obtained
by an Agent of type x at time t when he consumes c. We assume that the map c 7−→ u(t, x, c) is non-decreasing
and concave for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X. Moreover, the map u is assumed to be jointly continuous, such that
x 7−→ u(t, x, c) is non-decreasing and differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere for every (t, c) ∈ [0, T ] × C,
and such that c 7−→ ∂u∂x (t, x, c) is invertible. Finally, we assume that if C = R+, the value u(t, x, 0) ∈ R+ is
independent of x, and if C = R∗+ that limc→0 u(t, x, c) = −∞, for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X. In other words, all
the Agents have the same utility when they do not consume electricity.
• f : X −→ R+ is the distribution of the Agent’s type over the population. As is customary in adverse selection
problems, f is supposed to be known by the Principal.
4.1 Agent’s problem
Let us start by defining the consumption strategies that the Agents are allowed to use. A consumption strategy c
will be said to be admissible, which we denote by c ∈ C, if it is a Borel measurable map from [0, T ] to C. Given a
tariff p, that is a map from [0, T ] × R+ to R, proposed by the Principal, an Agent of type x ∈ X determines his
consumption by solving the following problem
UA(p, x) := sup
c∈C
∫ T
0
(
u(t, x, c(t))− p(t, c(t)))dt. (4.1)
The tariff that the Principal can offer to the Agents has to satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) and the individual
rationality (IR) conditions. In our setting, there is no moral hazard, so that the incentive compatibility condition
is automatically satisfied. Furthermore, the (IR) condition can be expressed through the set X(p) of the types of
Agents which accept the contract p, which can be defined as
X(p) := {x ∈ X, UA(p, x) ≥ H(x)} ,
with a continuous and non-decreasing function H which represents the reservation utility of the Agents of different
types, that is to say the utility that the Agents can hope to obtain by subscribing their power contract with a
competitor. Agents for which the map UA(p, ·) is smaller than H will not accept the contract offered by the Principal.
We are now ready to give our definition of admissible tariffs, which uses vocabulary from u−convex analysis. We
have regrouped all the pertinent results and definitions in Appendix A, for readers not familiar with this theory.
Definition 4.1. A tariff p : [0, T ]× C −→ R will be said to be admissible, denoted by p ∈ P, if it satisfies
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(i) For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X(p) the set ∂?p?(t, x) is non–empty.
(ii) The map x 7−→ p?(t, x) is continuous on X, differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere, for every t ∈ [0, T ], and
satisfies ∫ T
0
∫
X
∣∣∣∣∂p?∂x
∣∣∣∣ (t, x)dxdt < +∞.
(iii) If one defines the map c? : [0, T ]× [0, 1] −→ R+ by
c?(t, x) =
(
∂u
∂x
(t, x, ·)
)(−1)(
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
)
, (4.2)
then the restriction of p to {(t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× C, ∃x ∈ X(p), c = c?(t, x)} is u−convex.
Let us comment on the above definition. First of all, the regularity assumptions are mainly technical. In principle,
we would like to deal with tariffs p which are u−convex since they are completely characterised by their u−transform
p?, which will be our object of study later on. However, we can ask for less than that. The main point here is
that since only the clients with type in X(p) are going to accept the contract, the Principal will only have to face
consumption levels chosen by these clients. Besides, as we are going to prove in the next proposition, this optimal
consumption is exactly c?(t, x). Therefore, any consumption c ∈ C which does not belong to the pre–image of X(p)
will never have to be considered by the Principal. In particular, there is a degree of freedom when defining the value
of the tariff p there. Indeed, if clients of some type x reject the contract p, they will reject any contract with a
higher price. This is the reason why we do not impose the admissible tariffs to be u−convex on C but only on the
corresponding pre–image of the set X(p).
Our main result in this section is
Proposition 4.1. For every p ∈ P and for almost every x ∈ X(p), we have
UA(p, x) =
∫ T
0
p?(t, x)dt,
and the optimal consumption of Agents of type x at any time t ∈ [0, T ] is given by c?(t, x) defined in (4.2). In
particular, X(p) can be defined through p? only as follows
X(p) = X?(p?) :=
{
x ∈ X, P ?(x) :=
∫ T
0
p?(t, x)dt ≥ H(x)
}
.
4.2 The Principal’s problem
The Principal sets a tariff p ∈ P as a solution to her maximisation problem
UP := sup
p∈P
∫ T
0
[ ∫
X(p)
p(t, c?(t, x))f(x)dx−K
(
t,
∫
X(p)
c?(t, x)f(x)dx
)]
dt. (4.3)
Using the results of Section 4.1, we can rewrite this problem in terms of p? only as
UP = sup
p∈P
∫ T
0
[ ∫
X?(p?)
(
u
(
t, x,
(
∂u
∂x
(t, x, ·)
)(−1)(
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
))
− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
−K
(
t,
∫
X?(p?)
(
∂u
∂x
(t, x, ·)
)(−1)(
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
)]
dt, (4.4)
Now notice from (4.2) that p? is actually non-decreasing in x (since x 7−→ u(t, x, c) is non-decreasing for every
(t, c) ∈ [0, T ] × C). Let us then consider the space C+ of maps g, such that for every t ∈ [0, T ], x 7−→ g(t, x) is
continuous and non–decreasing with ∫ T
0
∫
X
∣∣∣∣∂g∂x (t, y)
∣∣∣∣dydt < +∞.
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We shall actually consider a relaxation of the problem of the Principal U˜P ≥ UP , defined by
U˜P := sup
p?∈C+
∫ T
0
[ ∫
X?(p?)
(
u
(
t, x,
(
∂u
∂x
(t, x, ·)
)(−1)(
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
))
− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
−K
(
t,
∫
X?(p?)
(
∂u
∂x
(t, x, ·)
)(−1)(
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
)]
dt, (4.5)
where we have forgotten the implicit link existing between p and p?, which explains why we have in general U˜P ≥ UP .
We will see in the frameworks described below that we can give conditions under which the two problems are indeed
equal. The main advantage of U˜P is that it no longer contains the condition that p? has to be u−convex, a constraint
that is not easy to consider in full generality.
We emphasise that problem U˜P is well defined, since the elements of C+ are non–decreasing with respect to x
and thus differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere. Our aim now will be to compute U˜P . However, the present
framework is far too general to hope obtaining explicit solutions, which are of the utmost interest in our electricity
pricing model, so for the rest of the paper we will concentrate our attention on the case of Agents with power–type
CRRA utilities.
4.3 Agents with CRRA utilities
For the sake of tractability, we shall use the following standing assumptions
Assumption 4.1. (i) X = [0, 1].
(ii) We have for every (t, x, c) ∈ [0, T ]×X × C
u(t, x, c) = gγ(x)φ(t)
cγ
γ
,
for some γ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), some map gγ : X −→ R+ which is continuous, increasing if γ ∈ (0, 1), decreasing if
γ ∈ (−∞, 0), and for some continuous map φ : [0, T ] −→ R?+.
Let us comment on this modelling choice for the utility function. The term gγ(x) represents the willingness of the
Agents to pay for their consumption, i.e. their need for energy depends on their type. The term φ is common to every
type of Agents and represents the fact that (almost) everyone is eager to consume at the same time (for example
during the day rather than at night). Furthermore, we consider both the cases γ ∈ (0, 1), which would be the classical
power utility function, as well as the case γ < 0, which corresponds to a situation where Agents actually cannot
avoid consuming electricity, as it would provide them a utility equal to −∞, which may be seen as more realistic.
As discussed previously, taking γ ∈ (0, 1) identifies to considering industrial Agents, and γ < 0 more typically refers
to residential Agents.
Equation (4.2) now can be written as
c?(t, x) =
(
γ
φ (t) g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
. (4.6)
By inserting the previous expression in equation (4.3) and using that
p(t, c?(t, x)) = gγ(x)φ(t)
c?(t, x)γ
γ
− p?(t, x),
the relaxed problem to solve can now be expressed as
U˜P = sup
p?∈C+
∫ T
0
[ ∫
X?(p?)
(
gγ(x)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx−K
(
t,
∫
X?(p?)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt.
(4.7)
The aim of next sections is to solve problem U˜P . In Section 5, we will focus on the particular case where the
reservation utility H is constant, and shall consider the more general case where it may depend on the Agents’ type
in Section 6.
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5 Constant reservation utility
We consider in this section a further simplification, related to the reservation utility of the Agents, which we suppose
to be independent of their type. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 6.
Assumption 5.1. The reservation utility H is actually independent of x, that is
H(x) =: H, for every x ∈ [0, 1].
When the function H is constant, the set of Agents who accept any tariff becomes an interval. Indeed, under
Assumptions 4.1 and 5.1, the (IR) condition reduces to
X?(p?) =
{
x ∈ [0, 1],
∫ T
0
p?(t, x)dt ≥ H
}
.
Since p? is non–decreasing in x, we have for any x0 ∈ [0, 1] that∫ T
0
p?(t, x0)dx ≥ H =⇒
∫ T
0
p?(t, x)dx ≥ H, ∀x ≥ x0.
Therefore, the set X?(p?) has necessarily the form
X?(p?) = [x0, 1],
where x0 ∈ [0, 1] needs to be determined and verifies, by continuity, that P ?(x0) = H. This means that the Principal
will only select the Agents of high type, greater than some value x0.
We can now look at an equivalent formulation of the problem of the Principal, in which we first choose x0, and then
optimise over the tariffs for which X?(p?) is exactly [x0, 1]. The problem (4.7) can therefore be written as
U˜P = sup
x0∈[0,1]
sup
p?∈C+(x0)
∫ T
0
[ ∫ 1
x0
(
gγ(x)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
−K
(
t,
∫ 1
x0
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt, (5.1)
with
C+(x0) :=
{
p? ∈ C+,
∫ T
0
p?(t, x0)dt = H
}
=
{
p? ∈ C+, X?(p?) = [x0, 1]
}
.
Formulation (5.1) is convenient because it allows to reduce problem U˜P to a one–dimensional one. To do so, we first
need to find the best map p? in the set C+(x0), for each x0.
Finally, we will rewrite the relaxed problem of the Principal once more, in order to focus only in the derivative of the
u−transform p?. Denote by F the cumulative distribution function of the types of Agents. By integration by parts
we have for every x0 ∈ [0, 1] and every p? ∈ C+(x0)∫ T
0
[ ∫ 1
x0
(
gγ(x)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx−K
(
t,
∫ 1
x0
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt
=
∫ T
0
[ ∫ 1
x0
(
gγ(x)
g′γ(x)
f(x) + F (x)− 1
)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)dx−K
(
t,
∫ 1
x0
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt
+ (F (x0)− 1)
∫ T
0
p?(t, x0)dt.
We therefore end up with the maximization problem
U˜P = sup
x0∈[0,1]
sup
p?∈C+(x0)
∫ T
0
[ ∫ 1
x0
(
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)dx
−K
(
t,
∫ 1
x0
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt+ (F (x0)− 1)H. (5.2)
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We can now state our main result of this section, providing the solution to the relaxed problem U˜P and conditions
under which we can recover the solution to the original problem UP . For ease of presentation, we introduce the
following function
`(x0) :=
∫ 1
x0
([
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx, x0 ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 5.1. Let Assumptions 4.1 and 5.1 hold. We have
(i) The maximum in (5.1) is attained for the maps
p?(t, x) = p?(t, x?0) +
∫ x
x?0
g′γ(y)
γ
(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(y)f(y) + g
′
γ(y)F (y)− g′γ(y)
]+
f(y)∂K∂c (t, A(t, x
?
0))
) γ
1−γ
dy, x ∈ [0, 1],
where A(t, x0) is defined
A(t, x0) :=
∫ 1
x0
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx.
and x?0 is any maximizer of the map
[0, 1] 3 x0 7−→
∫ T
0
(
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, x0))m(t, x0)−K(t, γm(t, x0))
)
dt+ (F (x0)− 1)H,
with
m(t, x0) :=
φ
1
1−γ (t)`(x0)
γ
(
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, x0))
) 1
1−γ
, (t, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1],
and t 7−→ p?(t, x?0) is any map such that ∫ T
0
p?(t, x?0)dt = H.
For instance, one can choose p?(t, x?0) := H/T, t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) Define p for any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+ by
p(t, c) = sup
x∈[0,1]
{
gγ(x)φ(t)
cγ
γ
− p?(t, x)
}
.
If the map defined on [0, 1] by
x 7−→ g′γ(x)
([
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
]+
f(x)
) γ
1−γ
,
is non–decreasing, then p? is u−convex, and p is the optimal tariff for the problem (4.3). Furthermore, the Principal
only signs contracts with the Agents of type x ∈ [x?0, 1].
(iii) Finally, in the case γ ∈ (0, 1), if f is non–increasing and the map
β : x 7−→ (gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x))
fγ(x)
,
is increasing over the set L := {x ∈ [0, 1], β(x) > 0}, then x?0 is unique and is characterised by the equation(
1− γ
γ
)
φ(t)
1
1−γ β(x?0)(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, x
?
0))
) γ
1−γ
= f(x?0)H.
The same result holds in the case γ ∈ (−∞, 0) if f is non–decreasing and β is decreasing over L.
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5.1 An explicit example
We insist on the fact that the tariff p defined in Theorem 5.1 is u−convex by definition, and it is finite since it is
written as a supremum of a continuous function over a compact set. In order to verify that p ∈ P, one therefore
only needs to make sure that p? is indeed the u−transform of p (which is the case if p? is u−convex) and satisfies
the other required properties. We will consider here a simplified framework where all the computations can be done
almost explicitly.
Assumption 5.2. The cost function K is given, for some n > 1, by
K(t, c) := k(t)
cn
n
, (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+,
for some map k : [0, T ] −→ R?+. Moreover, the distribution of the type of Agents is uniform, that is f(x) = 1, and
we impose gγ(x) := x1γ∈(0,1) + (1− x)1γ<0, for every x ∈ [0, 1].
Under Assumption 5.2, we then have
A(t, x0) =
(
φ(t)
k(t)
) 1
n−γ
`
1−γ
n−γ (x0),
and the maximisation problem becomes
U˜P = sup
x0∈[0,1]
{(
1
γ
− 1
n
)∫ T
0
(
φ(t)n
k(t)γ
) 1
n−γ
dt `(x0)
n(1−γ)
n−γ + (x0 − 1)H
}
.
Define
Bγ(T ) :=
(
1
γ
− 1
n
)∫ T
0
(
φ(t)n
k(t)γ
) 1
n−γ
dt, Φ(x0) := Bγ(T )`(x0)
n(1−γ)
n−γ + (x0 − 1)H,
where we emphasise that since n > 1, when γ ∈ (0, 1), we easily have that Bγ(T ) > 0, while Bγ(T ) < 0 when γ < 0.
Furthermore, we remind the reader that when γ > 0, the reservation utility of the Agents is necessarily non–negative,
while it has to be negative when γ < 0, since the utility function itself is negative.
In this setting, the sufficient conditions for the u−convexity of the solution p? to the relaxed problem are satisfied.
Our result therefore rewrites in this case
Theorem 5.2. Let Assumptions 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2 hold.
(i) If γ ∈ (0, 1) then, the optimal tariff p ∈ P is given for any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+ by
p(t, c) = φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+
((
φ(t)
2
) 1
1−γ 1− γ
γM(t)
) 1−γ
γ
c− H
T
+M(t)(2x?0 − 1)
1
1−γ ,
where
M(t) =
1− γ
2γ
(
2(2− γ)
1− γ
) γ(n−1)
n−γ
(
φn(t)
kγ(t)
) 1
n−γ (
1− (2x?0 − 1)
2−γ
1−γ
)− γ(n−1)n−γ
,
and where x?0 is the unique solution in (1/2, 1) of the equation
H = 2nAγ(T )
2− γ
n− γ (2x
?
0 − 1)
1
1−γ
(
1− (2x?0 − 1)
2−γ
1−γ
)− γ(n−1)n−γ
.
Furthermore, only the Agents of type x ≥ x?0 will accept the contract.
(ii) If γ < 0, then the optimal tariff p ∈ P is given for any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+ by
p(t, c) = −γc
(
−φ(t)
γ
) 1
γ
(
1− γ
M̂(t)
) 1−γ
γ
− H
T
− M̂(t)(1− x̂?0)
1
1−γ ,
where
M̂(t) = −1− γ
γ
(
2− γ
1− γ
) γ(n−1)
n−γ
(
2γφn(t)
kγ(t)
) 1
n−γ
(1− x̂?0)−
γ(2−γ)(n−1)
(n−γ)(1−γ) ,
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and where
x̂?0 :=
(
1−
(
n− γ
n(1− γ)Bγ(T )H
) n−γ
n(1−γ)+γ
(
2− γ
1− γ
) −γ(n−1)
n(1−γ)+γ
2
−n
n(1−γ)+γ
)+
.
Furthermore, only the Agents of type x ≥ x̂?0 will accept the contract.
6 Type–dependent reservation utilities
In this section, we study the case where the reservation utility H is a general continuous and non–decreasing function
of the type x ∈ [0, 1]. This case strongly differs from the previous section as we can no longer guarantee that the
set of Agents signing the contract with the Principal is in general an interval. The best we can say is that, under
appropriate conditions on H, the set X?(p) is indistinguishable from a countable union of open intervals. However,
this fact does not allow us to reduce the dimensionality of the problem of the Principal and even the existence of a
solution to it is not guaranteed. For this reason, we need to impose some additional structure to the set of admissible
tariffs in order to obtain a well–posed problem. Specifically, we will consider a new set of admissible tariffs which is
contained in a reflexive Banach space and we will use classical results from functional analysis to prove the existence
of solutions to the Principal’s problem. With that purpose in mind, we introduce the following Sobolev–like spaces.
Definition 6.1. For any ` ≥ 1 and any open subset O of X, we denote byW 1,`x (O) the space of maps q : [0, T ]×O −→
R for which there exists a null set N (q) ⊂ [0, T ] (for the Lebesgue measure) satisfying that for every t ∈ [0, T ] \N (q)
the map x 7−→ q(t, x) belongs to W 1,`(O)2 and such that
||q||`,O :=
(∫ T
0
∫
O
|q(t, x)|`dxdt
) 1
`
+
(∫ T
0
∫
O
∣∣∣∣ ∂q∂x (t, x)
∣∣∣∣`dxdt
) 1
`
<∞.
Remark 6.1. For the rest of the paper, for every map q belonging to some space W 1,`x (O), the set N (q) will make
reference to the one mentioned in Definition 6.1.
For all the analysis of this section, we fix a number m > 1 such that mγ < 1. We are now ready to give our new
definition of admissible tariffs.
Definition 6.2. A tariff p : [0, T ]×R+ −→ R is said to be admissible (in the case when H is not constant), denoted
by p ∈ P̂, if in addition to Definition 4.1, it satisfies that p? ∈W 1,mx (
o
X).
In this new setting, the Principal offers a tariff p ∈ P̂ which solves her maximisation problem
ÛP := sup
p∈P̂
∫ T
0
[ ∫
X?(p?)
p(t, c?(t, x))f(x)dx−K
(
t,
∫
X?(p?)
c?(t, x)f(x)dx
)]
dt. (6.1)
Following the previous sections, we will consider the problem UP ≥ ÛP , in which we drop the u−convexity property,
defined by
UP = sup
p?∈Ĉ+
∫ T
0
[ ∫
X?(p?)
(
gγ(x)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx−K
(
t,
∫
X?(p?)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt,
(6.2)
where Ĉ+ = C+∩W 1,mx (
o
X). We aim at solving the relaxed problem UP and give conditions under which its solution
coincides with the solution to ÛP .
Now, moving to the reservation utility function H, recall that it determines the structure of the set X?(p?). In order
to avoid complex forms of this set we make the following assumption on g, H and f .
Assumption 6.1. The functions g and H are such that for every x ∈ [0, 1]
gγ(x)
g′γ(x)
≤ H(x)
H ′(x)
. (6.3)
2That is to say the usual Sobolev space of maps admitting a weak first order derivative.
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Moreover, the following maps
v1(x) := g
′
γ(x)
([
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)
]+
f(x)
) γ
1−γ
, v2(x) := g
′
γ(x)
([
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
]+
f(x)
) γ
1−γ
,
are non–decreasing on [0, 1].
Remark 6.2. Condition (6.3) is equivalent to the elasticity of reservation utility being less than the elasticity of
willingness to pay for consumption. For instance, in the case γ ∈ (0, 1), it is automatically satisfied when H is
constant, and if gγ(x) = x then (6.3) reduces to H being concave. Similarly, in the case γ < 0, (6.3) holds if
gγ(x) = 1−x and H(x) = xα with α > 1. On the other hand, if for instance, f(x) = 1 and g(x) = xα with α ∈ (0, 1],
then v1, v2 are increasing when α ≥ 1− γ.
The following proposition shows that when Condition (6.3) holds, it is actually never optimal for the Principal to
propose a tariff for which the utility of the Agents is exactly their reservation utility on a set with positive Lebesgue
measure.
Proposition 6.1. Let Assumptions 4.1 and 6.1 hold, and let p? ∈ Ĉ+ be any function such that the set
Y ?(p?) := {x ∈ [0, 1], P ?(x) = H(x)} ,
has positive Lebesgue measure. Then p? is not optimal for problem (6.2).
We can now split the problem of the Principal into subintervals. Thanks to the previous proposition, we can consider
without loss of generality functions p? ∈ Ĉ+ such that the Lebesgue measure of Y ?(p?) is zero. For these functions,
we define the set
X̂?(p?) := X?(p?) \ Y ?(p?) = {x ∈ [0, 1], P ?(x) > H(x)} ,
which by continuity is an open subset of [0, 1]. As X? and p? are continuous, we can replace all the integrals over
X?(p?) by integrals over X̂?(p?) and we can write the latter set as a countable union of open disjoint intervals, that
is
X̂?(p?) := [0, b0) ∪
⋃
n≥1
(an, bn) ∪ (a0, 1],
for some a0 ∈ (0, 1], b0 ∈ [0, 1), and 0 < an < bn < 1, ∀n ≥ 0. We denote a := (an)n≥0, b := (bn)n≥0 and define A as
the set of such that pairs (a, b). Similar to the previous section, we will use the characterisation of the set X?(p?)
to reformulate the problem of the Principal. For each possible set X?(p?), we will solve the sub–problem in which
the set of tariffs reduces to the ones for which the set of Agents accepting the contract is exactly X?(p?). For any
(a, b) ∈ A, we define the set
X?(a, b) = [0, b0) ∪
⋃
n≥1
(an, bn) ∪ (a0, 1].
We can therefore write
UP = sup
(a,b)∈A
sup
p?∈C+(a,b)
∫ T
0
[ ∫
X?(a,b)
(
g(x)
g′(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
−K
(
t,
∫
X?(a,b)
(
γ
φ(t)g′(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt, (6.4)
where C+(a, b) is given by all the maps p? ∈ Ĉ+ such that X̂?(p?) = X?(a, b).
Remark 6.3. The case b0 = 0 stands for P ?(b0) < H(b0) and the case a0 = 1 stands for P ?(a0) < H(a0). By
continuity we have P ?(an) = H(an) and P ?(bn) = H(bn) for every n ≥ 1.
For fixed (a, b) ∈ A, define the operator Ψ(a,b) : C+(a, b) −→ R by
Ψ(a,b)(p
?) :=
∫ T
0
[ ∫
X?(a,b)
(
gγ(x)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
−K
(
t,
∫
X?(a,b)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt.
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As previously explained, we focus on the problem in which the set of Agents signing the contract is fixed. Define
(Pa,b) sup
p?∈C+(a,b)
Ψ(a,b)(p
?).
Our first result gives the existence of a solution to the above infinite-dimensional optimisation problem, and requires
the following assumption, which involves mainly the cost function. It is required in order to obtain nice coercivity
properties
Assumption 6.2. The cost function K satisfies the following growth condition
K(t, c) ≥ k(t)cn, ∀c ∈ C,
where the map k : [0, T ] −→ R+ is bounded from below by some constant k > 0 and n ≥ 1. Moreover, we have that
I := inf
{
k(t)
(
γf(x)
φ(t)g′γ(x)
)n
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1]
}
> 0.
We now have
Proposition 6.2. Let Assumptions 4.1, 6.1 and 6.2 hold. For every (a, b) ∈ A, the optimization problem (Pa,b) has
at least one solution.
Next, we obtain necessary optimality conditions for problem (Pa,b). Recalling from Remark 6.3 that the (IR) condition
is binding at each an, bn, by integration by parts we can rewrite Ψ(a,b) as
Ψ(a,b)(p
?) =
∫ T
0
(∫ b0
0
(
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)
)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)dx+
∫ 1
a0
(
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)dx
)
dt
+
∞∑
n=1
∫ T
0
∫ bn
an
(
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)
)
g′(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)dxdt
−K
(
t,
∫
(0,b0)∪
⋃
n≥1(an,bn)∪(a0,1)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)
dt
+
∞∑
n=1
F (an)H(an)−
∞∑
n=1
F (bn)H(bn)− F (b0)H(b0) + (F (a0)− 1)H(a0). (6.5)
To simplify notations, denote
A(t, a, b) :=
∫
X?(a,b)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx.
Theorem 6.1. Let Assumptions 4.1, 6.1 and 6.2 hold and let p? be a solution of (Pa,b). Consider an interval
I = (x`, xr) ⊆ X?(a, b) such that P ?(x) > H(x) for every x ∈ I, P ?(x`) = H(xl) and P ?(xr) = H(xr). Then there
exists a null set N ⊂ [0, T ] and a constant µt for every t ∈ [0, T ] \ N such that the following optimality condition is
satisfied
(i) In the case I ⊆ (a0, 1), for every x ∈ I we have
∂p?
∂x
(t, x) =
(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x) + g′γ(x)µt
]+
f(x)∂K∂c (t, A(t, a, b))
) γ
1−γ
g′γ(x)
γ
. (6.6)
(ii) In the case I ⊆ (0, b0) ∪n≥1 (an, bn), for every x ∈ I we have
∂p?
∂x
(t, x) =
(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x) + g
′
γ(x)µt
]+
f(x)∂K∂c (t, A(t, a, b))
) γ
1−γ
g′γ(x)
γ
. (6.7)
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The proof of Theorem 6.1 consists in several technical propositions which are given and proved in Appendix D.2
below.
Even after solving the sub–problems (Pa,b), the main difficulty for moving back to the relaxed problem of the Principal
is the infinite dimensionality of the set A. However, equations (6.6) and (6.7) give us some insight on the behaviour
of the optimal tariff in the set of Agents accepting the contract, and how it can be used to obtain a finite–dimensional
formulation of Problem UP .
Under Assumption 6.1, the optimal tariffs are convex over intervals where the (IR) condition is not binding. This is
the last result of this section and it is a direct consequence of the fact that the functions v1 and v2 are non–decreasing,
which makes the derivative of p? non–decreasing as well. The convexity property will allow us to completely solve
the Principal’s problem in the next subsection, when the function H is strictly concave, because A will reduce to a
2–dimensional set. Other cases in which A is also finite–dimensional, and therefore the problem of the Principal can
be easily solved, are mentioned in the last subsection.
Proposition 6.3. Let Assumptions 4.1, 6.1 and 6.2 hold. Let p? be a solution to problem (Pa,b). Then P ? is convex
on every interval over which P ? is strictly greater than H.
6.1 Strictly concave reservation utility
In this section we assume the reservation utility function of the Agents is strictly concave.
Assumption 6.3. The map x 7−→ H(x) is strictly concave and non–decreasing.
The main consequence of Assumption 6.3 is the following simple result, which shows that we can always restrict our
attention to sets X? where only the most effective and less effective Agents sign the contract.
Proposition 6.4. Let Assumptions 4.1, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 hold. Let (a, b) ∈ A be such that 0 < an0 < bn0 < 1 for
some n0 ≥ 1. Then the solution to problem (Pa,b) is not optimal for problem (6.2).
In the rest of this section, we start by deriving a general solution under some implicit assumptions, and then show
that the latter can be verified in an example in the context of Assumption 5.2.
6.1.1 The general tariff
Proposition 6.4 implies that the solution of (6.4) is attained at some p? satisfying X̂?(p?) = [0, b0)∪(a0, 1].We expect
then the optimal tariff to look like the curve in Figure 8. Let us then define the set
A2 :=
{
(a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2, b ≤ a} .
Theorem 6.1 gives us only partial information about the solution of the problem (Pa,b), for (a, b) ∈ A2. Now that we
assume in addition that H is strictly concave, we can actually precise the necessary optimality conditions with the
following proposition, which tells us that the value of the constants µt is zero in the intervals of the form [0, b) and
(a, 1].
Proposition 6.5. Let Assumptions 4.1, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 hold. Let p? be a solution of (Pa,b), for (a, b) ∈ A2, and
I be as in Theorem 6.1. Then there exists a null set N ′ ⊂ [0, T ] such that for every t ∈ [0, T ] \ N ′ the optimality
conditions from Theorem 6.1 hold with µt = 0.
Following the computations of Section 5, we define
A(t, a0, b0) := g
(−1)
K
(
φ(t)
1
1−γ
∫ b0
0
(
[g(x)f(x) + g′(x)F (x)]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx
+ φ(t)
1
1−γ
∫ 1
a0
(
[g(x)f(x) + g′(x)F (x)− g′(x)]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx
)
.
The aim of the next proposition is similar in spirit to that of Proposition 6.4, in the sense that it allows to exclude
many specifications of (a, b) ∈ A2, for which the solution to the sub–problem (Pa,b) does not solve the general relaxed
problem UP .
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b0 a0
P ?(x)
H(x)
Figure 8: X̂?(p?) for strictly concave H.
Proposition 6.6. Let Assumptions 4.1, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 hold. Let p? be a solution of (Pa,b). If either
Ξγ(a0, b0) :=
∫ T
0
(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(a0)f(a0) + g
′
γ(a0)F (a0)− g′γ(a0)
]+
f(a0)
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, a0, b0))
) γ
1−γ g′γ(a0)
γ
dt < H ′(a0),
or
Ψγ(a0, b0) :=
∫ T
0
(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(b0)f(b0) + g
′
γ(b0)F (b0)
]+
f(b0)
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, a0, b0))
) γ
1−γ g′γ(b0)
γ
dt > H ′(b0),
then the solution to problem (Pa,b) is not optimal for problem (6.2).
Judging by the results of Proposition 6.6, it is natural to define A′2 as the set of all the pairs (a, b) ∈ A2 for which
Ξγ(a0, b0) ≥ H ′(a0), Ψγ(a0, b0) ≤ H ′(b0).
Thanks to Proposition 6.6, we have thus reduced problem UP to
UP = sup
(a0,b0)∈A′2
∫ T
0
 φ(t) 11−γ `(a0, b0)
γ
(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, a0, b0))
) γ
1−γ
−K
t, φ(t) 11−γ `(a0, b0)(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, a0, b0))
) 1
1−γ
dt+ θ(a0, b0),
where we abused notations and defined the corresponding functions
`(a0, b0) :=
∫ b0
0
(
[g(x)f(x) + g′(x)F (x)]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx+
∫ 1
a0
(
[g(x)f(x) + g′(x)F (x)− g′(x)]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx,
θ(a0, b0) :=− F (b0)H(b0) + (F (a0)− 1)H(a0).
Since all these maps are continuous on [0, 1]2, the supremum over the compact set above is attained at some (a?0, b?0) ∈
A′2. We have therefore proved our main result of this section
Theorem 6.2. Let Assumptions 4.1, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 hold. We have
(i) The maximum in (6.2) is attained for the map
p?(t, x) =

H(b?0)
T
− φ(t)
1
1−γ
γ
(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, a
?
0, b
?
0))
) γ
1−γ
∫ b?0
x
v1(y)dy, if x ∈ [0, b?0),
p˜?(t, x), if x ∈ [b?0, a?0],
H(a?0)
T
+
φ(t)
1
1−γ
γ
(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, a
?
0, b
?
0))
) γ
1−γ
∫ x
a?0
v2(y)dy, if x ∈ (a?0, 1],
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where p˜?(t, x) is any continuous and non-decreasing map (with respect to x) such that∫ T
0
p˜?(t, b?0)dt = H(b
?
0),
∫ T
0
p˜?(t, a?0)dt = H(a
?
0),
∫ T
0
p˜?(t, x)dt < H(x), for all x ∈ (b?0, a?0).
(ii) Define p, for any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+, by
p(t, c) := sup
x∈[0,1]
{
gγ(x)φ(t)
cγ
γ
− p?(t, x)
}
.
If p? is u−convex on X?(p?), then p is the optimal tariff for the problem (6.1). Furthermore, the Principal only signs
contracts with the Agents of type x ∈ [0, b?0] ∪ [a?0, 1].
6.1.2 Power type cost function
Exactly as in the case where H was independent of x, the computations become much simpler as soon as Assumption
5.2 holds. Let’s note Rγ(a0, b0) = 1 + (2b0)
2−γ
1−γ − ((2a0 − 1)+)
2−γ
1−γ if γ ∈ (0, 1) and Rγ(a0, b0) = 1− ((1− 2b0)+)
2−γ
1−γ +
(2− 2a0)
2−γ
1−γ if γ < 0. Then, the functions ` and A are given, for any (t, a0, b0) ∈ [0, T ]×A′2, by
`γ(a0, b0) =
1− γ
2(2− γ)Rγ(a0, b0), A(t, a0, b0) =
(
φ(t)
k(t)
) 1
n−γ
`(a0, b0)
1−γ
n−γ .
So, in order to obtain (a?0, b?0) we have to solve
sup
(a0,b0)∈A′2
(
1
γ
− 1
n
)∫ T
0
(
φ(t)n
k(t)γ
) 1
n−γ
dt `(a0, b0)
n(1−γ)
n−γ − b0H(b0) + (a0 − 1)H(a0). (6.8)
Let us now compute the associated tariff p and check that p indeed belongs to P and that its u−transform is p?. Fix
some t ∈ [0, T ] and define
Nγ :=
2
γ
1−γ (1− γ)
γ
(
2(2− γ)
1− γ
) γ(n−1)
n−γ
(
φn(t)
kγ(t)
) 1
n−γ
Rγ(a0, b0)
− γ(n−1)n−γ .
Recall that by Proposition 6.6, the following inequalities must be satisfied
(i) If γ ∈ (0, 1)
((2a?0 − 1)+)
γ
1−γ
γ`(a?0, b
?
0)
γ(n−1)
n−γ
∫ T
0
(
φ(t)n
k(t)γ
) 1
n−γ
dt ≥ H ′(a?0),
(2b?0)
γ
1−γ
γ`(a?0, b
?
0)
γ(n−1)
n−γ
∫ T
0
(
φ(t)n
k(t)γ
) 1
n−γ
dt ≤ H ′(b?0). (6.9)
(ii) If γ < 0
− (2(1− a
?
0)
+)
γ
1−γ
γ`(a?0, b
?
0)
γ(n−1)
n−γ
∫ T
0
(
φ(t)n
k(t)γ
) 1
n−γ
dt ≥ H ′(a?0), −
((1− 2b?0)+)
γ
1−γ
γ`(a?0, b
?
0)
γ(n−1)
n−γ
∫ T
0
(
φ(t)n
k(t)γ
) 1
n−γ
dt ≤ H ′(b?0). (6.10)
Notice in particular that when γ ∈ (0, 1), (6.9) implies that a?0 > 1/2, sinceH is increasing. With similar computations
as in Section 5.1, we compute that
(i) If γ ∈ (0, 1)
p?(t, x) =

H(b?0)
T
−Nγ
(
(b?0)
1
1−γ − x 11−γ
)
, if x ∈ [0, b?0),
p˜?(t, x), if x ∈ [b?0, a?0],
H(a?0)
T
+Nγ
((
x− 1
2
) 1
1−γ
−
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
)
, if x ∈ (a?0, 1],
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(ii) If γ < 0
p?(t, x) =

H(b?0)
T
−Nγ
((
1
2
− b?0 ∧
1
2
) 1
1−γ
−
(
1
2
− x ∧ 1
2
) 1
1−γ
)
, if x ∈ [0, b?0),
p˜?(t, x), if x ∈ [b?0, a?0],
H(a?0)
T
+Nγ
(
(1− x) 11−γ − (1− a?0)
1
1−γ
)
, if x ∈ (a?0, 1],
Actually, in this case, the map p? will be u−convex if and only if the following implicit assumption holds.
Assumption 6.4. The solutions (a?0, b?0) of (6.8) are such that
b?0 ≤ a?0 −
1
2
.
Our main result in this case reads.
Theorem 6.3. Let Assumptions 4.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 hold, then the optimal tariff p ∈ P̂ is given for any
(t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+, when γ ∈ (0, 1) by
p(t, c) =

φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+ φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
− H(a
?
0)
T
, if Lγ(t)
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
< c,
x˜?(c)φ(t)
cγ
γ
− p˜?(t, x˜(c)), if Lγ(t)(b?0)
1
1−γ < c ≤ Lγ(t)
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
,
φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c− H(b
?
0)
T
+Nγ(b
?
0)
1
1−γ , if 0 ≤ c ≤ Lγ(t)(b?0)
1
1−γ ,
and when γ < 0 by
p(t, c) =

φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ(1− a?0)
1
1−γ − H(a
?
0)
T
, if 0 < c ≤ Lγ(t)(1− a?0)
1
1−γ ,
x˜?(c)φ(t)
cγ
γ
− p˜?(t, x˜(c)), if Lγ(t)(1− a?0)
1
1−γ < c ≤ Lγ(t)
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
,
φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+ φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
− H(b
?
0)
T
, if Lγ(t)
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
< c.
where Lγ(t) :=
(
γNγ
(1−γ)φ(t)
) 1
γ
and where (a?0, b?0) are maximizers of
sup
(a0,b0)∈A′2
C(T )Rγ(a0, b0)
n(1−γ)
2−γ − b0H(b0) + (a0 − 1)H(a0).
Furthermore, the Principal will only choose clients with type x ∈ [0, b?0] ∪ [a?0, 1].
6.2 General reservation utility
In this section, we want to point out that the assumption of the reservation utility function H being strictly concave
is not mandatory in order to solve problem (6.2). We intend to explain in which other cases we can hope to solve
the problem and what procedure can be followed to do so.
In order to reduce the relaxed problem UP to a finite dimensional problem, we need H to have at most a finite
number of intersecting points with a strictly convex function. If H were to satisfy this property, then we would be
able to prove a result similar to Proposition 6.4, and we would conclude that the optimal set Xˆ?(p?) is a finite union
of intervals contained in [0, 1]. The next step then would be to prove that the Lagrange multipliers µt in Theorem
6.1 are equal to zero, using for instance local perturbations as we did to prove Proposition 6.5. This would allow to
solve explicitly the optimality conditions (6.6) and (6.7) by using the corresponding auxiliary map A(a, b).
An interesting example of a reservation utility function satisfying the finite intersecting points property is the
“constant–linear” case, which is presented next and leads to a 3–dimensional optimisation problem.
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Example 6.1. Suppose that for some α, β ≥ 0 and xh ∈ [0, 1], H has the form
H(x) =
{
β, if x ∈ [0, xh],
α(x− xh) + β, if x ∈ [xh, 1].
Such a reservation utility accounts for the fact that all the Agents, whatever their appetence for power consumption
is, should at least receive a minimal level of utility, in this case β. Though in general two convex functions can
intersect at countably many points, given the specific form of H, it can intersect an increasing and convex function
at, at most, three points, as shown in Figure 9.
a1 a2 a3xh
P ?(x)
H(x)
(a) Case a1 = 0.
a1 a2 a3xh
H(x)
P ?(x)
(b) Case a1 > 0.
Figure 9: X?(p?) for a "constant-linear" H.
Therefore, we deduce that X?(p?) has the following form
X?(p?) = [a1, a2] ∪ [a3, 1], for some 0 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ a3 ≤ 1.
We define then the set
A3 :=
{
(a, b, c) ∈ [0, 1]2, a ≤ b ≤ c} .
After proving that the Lagrange multipliers µt in Theorem 6.1 are equal to zero, Problem UP becomes, abusing
notations slightly
sup
(a1,a2,a3)∈A3
∫ T
0
 φ(t) 11−γ `(a1, a2, a3)
γ
(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, a1, a2, a3))
) γ
1−γ
−K
t, φ(t) 11−γ `(a1, a2, a3)(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, a1, a2, a3)
) 1
1−γ
dt+ θ(a1, a2, a3),
where for any (t, a1, a2, a3) ∈ [0, T ]×A3
`(a1, a2, a3) :=
∫ a2
a1
(
[gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)]
+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx+
∫ 1
a3
(
[gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)(F (x)− 1)]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx,
θ(a1, a2, a3) := F (a1)H(a1)− F (a2)H(a2) + (F (a3)− 1)H(a3),
A(t, a1, a2, a3) := g
(−1)
K
(
φ(t)
1
1−γ
∫ a2
a1
(
[gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)]
+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx
+ φ(t)
1
1−γ
∫ 1
a3
([
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx
)
.
Since all the maps are continuous, the previous problem has a solution (a?1, a?2, a?3) which provides the optimal tariff.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide an explicit formulation of optimal electricity tariffs, from the point of view of a power
company offering service to consumers facing alternatives for satisfying energy requirements. It covers the adverse
selection feature of Agents, which has been empirically highlighted in the literature [30], as electricity consumers tend
to select time-dependent tariff whenever they consume little during peak hours. From this perspective, our results
differ from the existing analysis in the literature on electricity pricing, which mainly focused on the point of view of
a monopoly needing to recover its costs, such as in the Ramsey–Boiteux pricing described in [5] or in [31]. Our main
result is the derivation of time–dependent and consumption–based optimal tariffs. They act in several ways in order
to reflect the increasing marginal cost of electricity production with the aggregate consumption, by
• making electricity more expensive in peak hours;
• increasing the marginal price of high consumption power units;
• excluding effectively some of the consumers, by offering a tariff which is too expensive in comparison to their
alternative sources of energy.
Our tariff structure can compare to common electricity tariffs which are often linear functions of the consumed
energy (see for example the Australia Queensland tariffs3). Indeed, our tariff is either linear or concave, in which
case it could be approximated for example by a set of non–crossing linear functions of consumed power, these linear
functions having a maximum power and a fixed charge increasing relative to this power limit. Interestingly, this
kind of tariff structure looks quite similar to the regulated electricity tariff menu offered to residential consumers in
France4. The main distinction is the concavity of our optimal tariff with respect to the power limit, whereas the
French regulated tariff is convex. This difference may be induced by our limitation to offering a single tariff instead
of a menu of contracts. By doing so, our tariff intends to address all consumers in a single function. As a future
research project, we are planing to tackle the extension of our model to a menu of tariffs, allowing more flexibility
for handling adverse selection.
This paper is but the first step in the direction we have outlined. In addition to extend the analysis to a menu
of tariffs, at this stage, there is no uncertainty in our model, and Agents commit for a definite period [0, T ]. At
a later stage, we plan to incorporate uncertainties in the model: there are fluctuations in the prices of primary
energies and changes in uses of electricity, and domestic consumption is subject to weather conditions. Expanding
the characteristics of Agents in order to model their ability to modulate their consumption is also a possible extension;
see for example [23] for an analysis of rational consumers who react imperfectly to prices or [36] for a model with
a portion of consumers who cannot modify their consumption. One can also consider more sophisticated contracts,
allowing for instance the producer to cut supply a certain number of days during the year. One should also take into
account the existence of a spot market for electricity, which creates arbitrage opportunities for the Agents. Most
tantalising are the congestion problems: peak hours are not seasonal, they result from aggregate behaviour, which is
strategic in nature, and call for an analysis in terms of mean field games.
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A u−convex analysis
We first recall the definition of u−convexity (adapted to our context, we refer the reader to the monograph by Villani
[41] on optimal transport theory for more details).
Definition A.1. Let ψ be a map from [0, T ]×X to R. The u−transform of ψ, denoted by ψ? : [0, T ]×C −→ R∪{+∞}
is defined by
ψ?(t, c) := sup
x∈X
{u(t, x, c)− ψ(t, x)} , for any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× C.
Similarly, if ϕ is a map from [0, T ] × C to R, its u−transform, still denoted by ϕ? : [0, T ] × X −→ R ∪ {+∞}, is
defined by
ϕ?(t, x) := sup
c∈C
{u(t, x, c)− ϕ(t, c)} , for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X.
A map φ : [0, T ]×C −→ R∪{+∞} is then said to be u−convex if it is proper5and if there exists some ψ : [0, T ]×X −→
R such that
φ(t, c) = ψ?(t, c), for any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× C.
Similarly, a map Φ : [0, T ] × X −→ R ∪ {+∞} is said to be u−convex if it is proper and there exists some Ψ :
[0, T ]× C −→ R such that
Φ(t, x) = Ψ?(t, x), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X.
We recall the following easy characterisation of u−convexity.
Lemma A.1. A map φ : [0, T ]× C −→ R ∪ {+∞} is u−convex if and only if
φ(t, c) = (φ?)?(t, c), for any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× C.
A similar statement holds for maps Φ : [0, T ]×X −→ R ∪ {+∞}.
Proof. We only prove the first statement, the other one being exactly similar. The result is an easy consequence of
the fact that for any map φ : [0, T ]× C −→ R ∪ {+∞}, we have the identity
φ?(t, x) = ((φ?)?)?(t, x), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X.
Indeed, we have by definition that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X
((φ?)?)?(t, x) = sup
c∈C
{
u(t, x, c)− sup
x′∈X
{
u(t, x′, c)− sup
c′∈C
{u(t, x′, c′)− φ(t, c′))}
}}
= sup
c∈C
inf
x′∈X
sup
c′∈C
{u(t, x, c)− u(t, x′, c) + u(t, x′, c′)− φ(t, c′)} .
Choosing x′ = x, we immediately get that ((φ?)?)?(t, x) ≤ φ?(t, x), while the converse inequality is obtained by
choosing c = c′. 2
Next, we can define the notion of the u−subdifferential of a u−convex function.
5That is to say not identically equal to +∞.
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Definition A.2. Let φ : [0, T ] × C −→ R ∪ {+∞} be a u−convex function. For any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ] × C, the
u−subdifferential of φ at the point (t, c) is the set ∂?φ(t, c) ⊂ X defined by
∂?φ(t, c) := {x ∈ X, φ?(t, x) = u(t, x, c)− φ(t, c)} .
Similarly, let ψ : [0, T ]×X −→ R∪{+∞} be a u−convex function. For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X, the u−subdifferential
of ψ at the point (t, x) is the set ∂?ψ(t, x) ⊂ R+ defined by
∂?ψ(t, x) := {c ∈ C, ψ?(t, c) = u(t, x, c)− ψ(t, x)} .
Notice that since the map u is continuous, a u−convex function is automatically lower-semicontinuous and its
u−subdifferential is a closed set.
B Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Since the space of admissible strategies for the Agent is decomposable and the integrand
is normal when p is admissible (see Definitions 14.59 and 14.27 in Rockafellar and Wets [35] and also the particular
case 14.29 of a Carethéodory integrand), we have from Theorem 14.60 in [35] that the solution of problem (4.1) is
given by pointwise optimisation. Moreover, ∂?p?(t, x) is non–empty for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X(p), so we have that
every optimal consumption strategy c? : [0, T ] −→ R+ satisfies c?(t) ∈ ∂?p?(t, x) for almost every t ∈ [0, T ] and
p?(t, x) = u(t, x, c?(t))− p(t, c?(t)).
Since u(t, x, 0) does not depend on x, the envelop Theorem ensures that the map x 7−→ p?(t, x) is differentiable
Lebesgue almost everywhere and that we have for almost every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X(p)
∂u
∂x
(t, x, c?(t)) =
∂p?
∂x
(t, x). (B.1)
Indeed, if c?(t) > 0, that is the classical envelop Theorem. Otherwise, when C = R+, it is immediate to check, using
the fact that u(t, x, 0) does not depend on x, that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X, we have
0 ∈ ∂?p?(t, x) =⇒ 0 ∈ ∂?p?(t, x′), for all x′ ≤ x,
so that both terms in (B.1) are then actually equal to 0.
Then, since the map c 7−→ ∂u∂x (t, x, c) is invertible, we have for almost every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X(p) that ∂?p?(t, x) is a
singleton, and the optimal consumption is c? : [0, T ]×X(p) −→ R+ defined in (4.2). 2
C Proofs of Section 5
Let us start this section with the following Lemma, which provides sufficient conditions of u−convexity when As-
sumption 4.1 holds.
Lemma C.1. Let Assumption 4.1 hold and suppose in addition that gγ is concave if γ ∈ (0, 1) and convex if
γ ∈ (−∞, 0). Let ψ : [0, T ] × X −→ R be a map such that x 7−→ ψ(t, x) is non-decreasing and convex. Then ψ is
u−convex. Furthermore, if we take
gγ(x) :=
{
x, if γ ∈ (0, 1),
1− x, if γ < 0,
then any u−convex function [0, T ]×X −→ R is convex.
Proof of Lemma C.1. By Lemma A.1, we know that the u−convexity of ψ is equivalent to
ψ(t, x) = sup
c>0
min
y∈[0,1]
{
(gγ(x)− gγ(y))φ(t)c
γ
γ
+ ψ(t, y)
}
. (C.1)
First notice that since ψ is convex in y and gγγ is concave, then for any (t, x, c) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1]× (0,+∞), the map
f(t,x)(y, c) := (gγ(x)− gγ(y))φ(t)c
γ
γ
+ ψ(t, y),
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is convex in y. Furthermore, for any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1]2, the map c 7−→ f(t,x)(y, c) is monotone on (0,+∞) and
therefore quasiconcave. Since [0, 1] is convex and compact, we can apply Sion’s minimax theorem [37] to obtain that
sup
c>0
min
y∈[0,1]
{
(gγ(x)− gγ(y))φ(t)c
γ
γ
+ ψ(t, y)
}
= min
y∈[0,1]
sup
c>0
{
(gγ(x)− gγ(y))φ(t)c
γ
γ
+ ψ(t, y)
}
= min
y∈[0,1]
{+∞1x>y + ψ(t, y)} = ψ(t, x),
since ψ is non-decreasing.
Finally, it is easy to see that when gγ is defined as in the statement of the lemma, we have
sup
c>0
min
y∈[0,1]
{
(gγ(x)− gγ(y))φ(t)c
γ
γ
+ ψ(t, y)
}
= sup
c>0
min
y∈[0,1]
{(x− y)c+ ψ(t, y)} ,
which corresponds to the classical convex conjugate, hence the desired result by Fenchel-Moreau’s theorem. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We optimise first with respect to p?. For fixed x0, start by defining Ψx0 : L1([0, T ] ×
[0, 1]) −→ R by
Ψx0(p
?) :=
∫ T
0
[ ∫ 1
x0
(
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
)
g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)dx
−K
(
t,
∫ 1
x0
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)]
dt+ (F (x0)− 1)H. (C.2)
Ψx0 is clearly continuous and Fréchet differentiable and it is also concave because K is convex in c. Furthermore, for
any q ∈ L1([0, T ]× [0, 1]), we have
Ψ′x0(p
?; q) =
∫ T
0
∫ 1
x0
(
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
)
g′γ(x)
∂q
∂x
(t, x)dxdt
−
∫ T
0
∫ 1
x0
∂q
∂x
(t, x)
1
γ
(
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1−γ
γ
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
) 1
γ
f(x)
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, x0)) dxdt,
where we defined
A(t, x0) :=
∫ 1
x0
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx.
Since Ψx0 is concave, the necessary and sufficient optimality condition for the problem with fixed x0 is
Ψ′x0(p
?; q) ≤ 0, ∀q ∈ TC+(x0)(p?), (C.3)
where TC+(x0)(p
?) denotes the tangent cone to the closed set C+(x0) at the point p? defined by
TC+(x0)(p
?) :=
{
z, ∃ε > 0,∀h ∈ [0, ε] ∃w(h) ∈ C+(x0), ||p? + hz − w(h)|| = ◦(h)
}
.
Using local functions we see that the inequality (C.3) must be satisfied almost everywhere on [0, T ]× [x0, 1], that is,
for every q ∈ TC+(x0)(p?) and almost every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [x0, 1] we have
∂q
∂x
(t, x)
[
(gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)(F (x)− 1))
g′γ(x)
− 1
γ
(
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1−γ
γ
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
) 1
γ
f(x)
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, x0))
]
≤ 0.
Therefore, the optimal p? ∈ C+(x0) should verify
∂p?
∂x
(t, x) =
φ(t) 1γ [gγ(x)f(x) + g′γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)]+
f(x)
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, x0))

γ
1−γ
g′γ(x)
γ
, (C.4)
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with a+ = max{a, 0}, the positive part operator. By the above equation, we must have
A(t, x0)
(
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, x0))
) 1
1−γ
= φ
1
1−γ (t)
∫ 1
x0
([
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx.
Now, let
gK(c) := c
(
∂K
∂c
(t, c)
) 1
1−γ
, c ≥ 0.
Since K is strictly convex and increasing with respect to c, it can be checked directly that gK is increasing as well
(on R+), so that we deduce
A(t, x0) = g
(−1)
K
φ 11−γ (t)∫ 1
x0
([
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
]+
fγ(x)
) 1
1−γ
dx
 .
Therefore the solution to the problem with fixed x0 is given by (C.4). We have thus reduced the problem (5.2) to
U˜P = sup
x0∈[0,1]
∫ T
0
 φ 11−γ (t)`(x0)
γ
(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, x0))
) γ
1−γ
−K
t, φ 11−γ (t)`(x0)(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, x0))
) 1
1−γ
 dt+ (F (x0)− 1)H.
Seen as a function of x0, the right-hand side above is clearly a continuous function. It therefore attains its maximum
over the compact set [0, 1] at some (possibly non unique) x?0. We will abuse notations and denote by x?0 a generic
maximiser.
If p? is u−convex, since p is also u−convex (by definition), then p? is necessarily the u−transform of p and therefore
p ∈ P, which means that we actually have U˜P = UP . For the uniqueness result, define
α(x0) :=
∫ T
0
 φ 11−γ (t)`(x0)
γ
(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, x0))
) γ
1−γ
−K
t, φ 11−γ (t)`(x0)(
∂K
∂c (t, A(t, x0))
) 1
1−γ
dt+ (F (x0)− 1)H.
Note that α does not attain its maximum over any interval outside L, because there ` is constant (and therefore
A(t, ·) too) and F is increasing. Then, since over L we have
α′(x0) =
∫ T
0
(
1− γ
γ
)
φ(t)
1
1−γ `′(x0)
(
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, x0))
) −γ
1−γ
dt+ f(x0)H
= −
∫ T
0
(
1− γ
γ
)
φ(t)
1
1−γ β(x0)
(
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, x0))
) −γ
1−γ
dt+ f(x0)H.
Under the hypotheses of the theorem, α′ is decreasing over L in each one of the two cases so α is strictly concave. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We divide the proof in two cases.
• Case 1: γ ∈ (0, 1)
In this case we have
`(x0) =
∫ 1
x0∨ 12
(2x− 1) 11−γ dx = 1− γ
2(2− γ)
(
1− ((2x0 − 1)+) 2−γ1−γ) .
Hence, it is clear that x0 7−→ Φ(x0) is increasing in [0, 12 ], so that it suffices to solve
sup
x0∈[1/2,1]
{
Bγ(T )`(x0)
n(1−γ)
n−γ + (x0 − 1)H
}
.
Let
y0 := (2x0 − 1) 11−γ , Aγ(T ) := Bγ(T )
(
1− γ
2(2− γ)
)n(1−γ)
n−γ
.
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Defining the map Φ : [0, 1] −→ R by
Φ(y0) := Φ
(
y1−γ0 + 1
2
)
,
we deduce
Φ(y0) = Aγ(T )
(
1− y2−γ0
)n(1−γ)
n−γ
+
1
2
(
y1−γ0 − 1
)
H.
Next, we can check directly that Φ is concave on [0, 1], and we have for any y0 ∈ [0, 1]
Φ
′
(y0) =
1− γ
2
y−γ0
(
H − 2nAγ(T ) 2− γ
n− γ y0
(
1− y2−γ0
)− γ(n−1)n−γ )
.
Denote finally for any y0 ∈ [0, 1]
χ(y0) := H − 2nAγ(T ) 2− γ
n− γ (2x0 − 1)
1
1−γ
(
1− y2−γ0
)− γ(n−1)n−γ
.
We have for any y0 ∈ [0, 1]
χ′(y0) = −2n(2− γ)
(n− γ)2 Aγ(T )
(
1− y2−γ0
)−n+γ(n−2)n−γ (
n− γ + γ(n− 1)(2− γ)y2−γ0
)
< 0,
since γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, since in addition we have
χ(0) = H > 0, and lim
y0↑1
χ(y0) = −∞,
there is a unique y?0 ∈ (0, 1) (and thus a unique x?0 ∈ (1/2, 1)) such that Φ
′
(y?0) = 0, at which the maximum of Φ is
attained. Finally, we can compute explicitly p?(t, x) for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1] as
p?(t, x) =
H
T
+M(t)
(
((2x− 1)+) 11−γ − (2x?0 − 1)
1
1−γ
)
,
where we defined for simplicity
M(t) :=
1− γ
2γ
(
2(2− γ)
1− γ
) γ(n−1)
n−γ
(
φn(t)
kγ(t)
) 1
n−γ (
1− (2x?0 − 1)
2−γ
1−γ
)− γ(n−1)n−γ
.
It can then be checked directly that for any c ≥ 0, the map x 7−→ xφ(t)cγ/γ− p?(t, x) is concave on [0, 1] and attains
its maximum at the point
x?(c) := 1
c>( 2γM(t)(1−γ)φ(t) )
1
γ
+
1
2
(
1 +
(
(1− γ)φ(t)
2γM(t)
) 1−γ
γ
c1−γ
)
1
c≤( 2γM(t)(1−γ)φ(t) )
1
γ
.
Therefore, we deduce immediately that for any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+
p(t, c) =

φ(t)
cγ
γ
+M(t)
(
(2x?0 − 1)
1
1−γ − 1
)
− H
T
, if c >
(
2γM(t)
(1− γ)φ(t)
) 1
γ
,
φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+
((
φ(t)
2
) 1
1−γ 1− γ
γM(t)
) 1−γ
γ
c− H
T
+M(t)(2x?0 − 1)
1
1−γ , otherwise.
Next, we notice that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1], the map c 7−→ xφ(t)cγ/γ − p(t, c) is decreasing on R+ if x < 1/2,
and that it is concave on R+ if x ≥ 1/2, so that it attains its maximum at the point
c?(t, x) :=
(
2γM(t)
(1− γ)φ(t)
) 1
γ
(2x− 1) 11−γ 1x∈(1/2,1].
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It is also immediate that p? is always non-decreasing and is convex, and therefore u−convex by Lemma C.1, so much
so that we conclude that p ∈ P.
It can easily be shown that the following suboptimal but simpler tariff will give the same results in terms of selected
Agents, optimal consumption and Principal’s utility. Indeed as no consumer select c >
(
2γM(t)
(1−γ)φ(t)
) 1
γ
, to replace the
relative tariff section by a higher function which means a more expensive contract does not modify the results. For
any (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+, the following tarif is also admissible
p(t, c) = φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+
((
φ(t)
2
) 1
1−γ 1− γ
γM(t)
) 1−γ
γ
c− H
T
+M(t)(2x?0 − 1)
1
1−γ
• Case 2: γ ∈ (−∞, 0)
Now, we actually have
`(x0) = 2
1
1−γ
∫ 1
x0
(1− x) 11−γ dx = 2 11−γ
(
1− γ
2− γ
)
(1− x0)
2−γ
1−γ .
The problem to solve is now
sup
x0∈[0,1]
{
Bγ(T )`(x0)
n(1−γ)
n−γ + (x0 − 1)H
}
.
It can be checked directly that the above map is actually strictly concave for x0 ∈ [0, 1], and therefore that it attains
its maximum at
x̂?0 :=
1− ( H
Bγ(T )
n− γ
n(1− γ)
) n−γ
n(1−γ)+γ
(
2− γ
1− γ
) −γ(n−1)
n(1−γ)+γ
2
−n
n(1−γ)+γ
+ .
Finally, we can compute explicitly p?(t, x) for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1] as
p?(t, x) =
H
T
+ M̂(t)
(
(1− x̂?0)
1
1−γ − (1− x) 11−γ
)
,
where we defined for simplicity
M̂(t) := −1− γ
γ
(
2− γ
1− γ
) γ(n−1)
n−γ
(
2γφn(t)
kγ(t)
) 1
n−γ
(1− x̂?0)−
γ(2−γ)(n−1)
(n−γ)(1−γ) .
We deduce directly that in this case the map x 7−→ (1 − x)φ(t)cγ/γ − p?(t, x) is concave, so that it attains its
maximum on [0, 1] at
x̂?(c) :=
1−(−φ(t)(1− γ)
γM̂(t)
) 1−γ
γ
c1−γ
+ ,
so that
p(t, c) =

φ(t)
cγ
γ
− H
T
− M̂(t)(1− x̂?0)
1
1−γ + M̂(t), if c >
(
− γM̂(t)
φ(t)(1− γ)
) 1
γ
,
−γc
(
−φ(t)
γ
) 1
γ
(
1− γ
M̂(t)
) 1−γ
γ
− H
T
− M̂(t)(1− x̂?0)
1
1−γ , otherwise.
It is also immediate in this case that p? is always non-decreasing and is convex, and therefore u−convex by Lemma
C.1, so much so that we conclude that p ∈ P.
It can easily be shown that the following suboptimal but simpler tariff will give the same results in terms of selected
Agents, optimal consumption and Principal’s utility because no consumer selects c >
(
− γM̂(t)φ(t)(1−γ)
) 1
γ
. For any
(t, c) ∈ [0, T ]× R+, the following tariff is also admissible
p(t, c) = −γc
(
−φ(t)
γ
) 1
γ
(
1− γ
M̂(t)
) 1−γ
γ
− H
T
− M̂(t)(1− x̂?0)
1
1−γ
2
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D Proofs of Section 6
D.1 Technical results
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Define the following functionals on Ĉ+
K(p) :=
∫ T
0
K
(
t,
∫
X?(p)
(
γ
φ(t)g′(x)
∂p
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)
dt,
J(p) :=
∫ T
0
[∫
X?(p)
(
g(x)
g′(x)
∂p
∂x
(t, x)− p(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
]
dt.
Proposition 6.1 states that if Y ?(p?) has positive measure, then p? is not a maximiser of p 7−→ J(p)− K(p) over the
set Ĉ+. Indeed, in this case we can find an interval [c, d] ⊂ Y ?(p?) (remember that this is an open set with positive
Lebesgue measure and that the latter is regular) and thus∫ T
0
p?(t, x)dt = H(x), for every x ∈ [c, d].
Next, define
T+ = {t ∈ [0, T ] : p?(t, c) < p?(t, d)} .
Since H is strictly increasing we have that T+ has positive Lebesgue measure. For every t ∈ T+, define over [c, d] a
continuous and increasing function q satisfying q(t, c) := p?(t, c), q(t, d) := p?(t, d) and q(t, x) < p?(t, x) over (c, d).
Consider the following modification of p?.
pˆ(t, x) :=
{
q(t, x), if (t, x) ∈ T+ × [c, d],
p?(t, x), if (t, x) 6∈ T+ × [c, d].
We have that X?(pˆ) = X?(p?) \ (c, d) and therefore K(pˆ) < K(p?). Moreover,
J(pˆ) = J(p?)−
∫ T
0
[∫ d
c
(
g(x)
g′(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)− p?(t, x)
)
f(x)dx
]
dt
= J(p?)−
∫ d
c
(
g(x)
g′(x)
H ′(x)−H(x)
)
f(x)dx > J(p?),
where we used Assumption 6.1. Since pˆ is also non-decreasing in x, pˆ ∈ Ĉ+, and we conclude that p? is not optimal.
2
Proof of Proposition 6.2. Note that in the optimisation problem (Pa,b) we can without loss of generality restrict
our attention to the feasible maps on [0, T ]×X?(a, b). In other words, for fixed (a, b) ∈ A, we define the closed and
convex set Fa,b as the set of maps q ∈ W 1.mx (X?(a, b)) such that for every t ∈ [0, T ], x 7−→ q(t, x) is continuous and
non–decreasing, Q(x) :=
∫ T
0
q(t, x)dt ≥ H(x) for every x ∈ X?(a, b) and Q(an) = H(an), Q(bn) = H(bn) for every
n ≥ 1.
We show that Ψ(a,b), seen on the Banach space
(
W 1,mx (X
?(a, b)), || · ||m,X?(a,b)
)
, is coercive on Fa,b.
• Case 1: γ ∈ (0, 1)
Observe first that if (qn)n∈N ⊂ Fa,b is such that ||qn||Lm([0,T ]×X?(a,b)) −→
n→∞ ∞, then since for every n ∈ N the map
x 7−→ ∫ T
0
qn(t, x)dt is bounded from below by H on X?(a, b), we have that
−
∫ T
0
∫
X?(a,b)
qn(t, x)f(x)dxdt −→
n→∞ −∞. (D.1)
Next, define
A :=
∫
X?(a,b)
f(x)
(
γ
φ(t)g′(x)
) 1
γ
dx, B :=
∫ T
0
k(t)dt.
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From Jensen’s inequality for the maps ψA(x) = x
1
γm , ψB(x) = x
n
γm , we have that (recall that m is such that γm < 1
and that n > 1)∫ T
0
K
(
t,
∫
X?(a,b)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂qn
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)
dt ≥
∫ T
0
k(t)
(∫
X?(a,b)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂qn
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx
)n
dt
≥ An(1− 1γm )
∫ T
0
k(t)
(∫
X?(a,b)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
) 1
γ
∣∣∣∣∂qn∂x (t, x)
∣∣∣∣mf(x)dx
) n
γm
dt
≥ An(1− 1γm )B(1− nγm )
(∫ T
0
∫
X?(a,b)
k(t)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
) 1
γ
∣∣∣∣∂qn∂x (t, x)
∣∣∣∣mf(x)dxdt
) n
γm
≥ An(1− 1γm )B(1− nγm )I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂qn∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣nγ
Lm([0,T ]×X?(a,b))
.
We have therefore proved that, denoting by m′ the conjugate of m
Ψ(a,b)(qn) ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣gγg′γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Lm′ ([0,T ]×X?(a,b))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂qn∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Lm([0,T ]×X?(a,b))
−An(1− 1γm )B1− nγm I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂qn∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣nγ
Lm([0,T ]×X?(a,b))
.
This with (D.1) implies clearly that Ψ(a,b) is indeed coercive in Fa,b.
• Case 2: γ < 0
In this case gγg′γ < 0. Since
∂qn
∂x is non-negative, if ||∂qn∂x ||Lm([0,T ]×X?(a,b)) −→∞ we have that∫ T
0
∫
X?(a,b)
gγ(x)
g′γ(x)
∂qn
∂x
(t, x)f(x)dx dt −→ −∞.
Then, from (D.1) and the positiveness of K we conclude that Ψ(a,b) is coercive in Fa,b.
To conclude the proof, note that W 1,mx (X?(a, b)) is a reflexive Banach space, so the coercivity of Ψ(a,b) implies that
it possesses at least a maximiser p? in Fa,b. Therefore any q ∈W 1.mx (0, 1), continuous and non-decreasing in x, which
coincides with p? in X?(a, b) and such that Q(x) =
∫ T
0
q(t, x)dt satisfies Q(x) < H(x) for x ∈ [0, 1] \ X?(a, b) is a
solution to (Pa,b).
We state the following Lemma before proving Proposition 6.5.
Lemma D.1. Let p? be a solution of (Pa,b). Define
T b0 =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : ∂p
?
∂x
(t, x) = 0,∀x ∈ (0, b0)
}
, T a0 =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : ∂p
?
∂x
(t, x) = 0,∀x ∈ (a0, 1)
}
.
If T a0 has positive Lebesgue measure, then for every x ∈ (0, b0), g(x)f(x) + g′(x)F (x) ≤ 0. If T b0 has positive
Lebesgue measure, then for every x ∈ (a0, 1), g(x)f(x) + g′(x)F (x)− g′(x) ≤ 0.
Proof. We consider the case in which T a0 has positive Lebesgue measure. Suppose there exist [x1, x2] ⊂ [a0, 1]
such that for every x ∈ [x1, x2]
g(x)f(x) + g′(x)F (x)− g′(x) > 0.
Then, for any q ∈ W 1,mx (0, 1) satisfying q(t, x) = 0,∀(t, x) 6∈ T a0 × [x1, 1], x 7−→ q(t, x) is increasing in [x1, x2],
∀t ∈ T a0 , and q(t, x) = q(t, x2), ∀(t, x) ∈ T a0 × [x2, 1], the map p? + εq belongs to C+(a, b) for ε ≥ 0. Therefore
Ψ′(a,b)(p
?; q) ≤ 0,, which means ∫
Ta0
∫ x2
x1
∂q
∂x
(t, x)
f(x)g(x) + g′(x)F (x)
g′(x)
≤ 0,
hence a contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 6.5. Let us prove the case I ⊂ (a0, 1), the case I ⊂ (0, b0) being similar. From the convexity
of P ? on every interval over which P ? is strictly greater than H we deduce the existence of c0 ∈ [a0, 1) such that
P ?(x) > H(x) for every x ∈ (c0, 1] and P ?(x) = H(x) for every x ∈ [a0, c0]. It follows from Lemma D.1 that
either T a0 is a null set or for every t ∈ T a0 the optimality conditions from Theorem 6.1 hold with µt = 0. Call
T1 = [0, T ] \ (N ∪ T a0) and define for every t ∈ T1
x1(t) = inf
{
x ∈ (c0, 1) : ∂p
?
∂x
(t, x) > 0
}
.
We have that p?(t, ·) is strictly increasing in [x1(t), 1] and it is given by (6.6). Define next
T+1 := {t ∈ T1, µt > 0} , T−1 := {t ∈ T1, µt < 0} .
We will prove that T−1 and T
+
1 have Lebesgue measure equal to zero. Consider any map q ∈W 1,mx (0, 1) satisfying{
q(t, x) = 0,∀(t, x) 6∈ T−1 × (x1(t), 1],
x 7−→ q(t, x) is increasing in [x1(t), 1],∀t ∈ T−1 .
Then p? + εq ∈ C+(a, b) for every ε ≥ 0, so Ψ′(p?; q) ≤ 0. Since
Ψ′(p?; q) =
∫
T−1
∫ 1
x1(t)
− ∂q
∂x
(t, x)µtdxdt,
we conclude that T−1 is a null set. Next, take any x¯ ∈ (c0, 1) such that P ?(x¯) > H(x¯) and for every t ∈ T+1 redefine
if necessary the point x1(t) in order to satisfy x1(t) ≥ x¯. Define then q : [0, T ]× [0, 1] −→ R by
q(t, x) := 1{t∈T+1 , x≥x1(t)}
∂p?
∂x (t, x1(t))(x− x1(t)) + p?(t, x1(t))− p?(t, x)
p?(t, 1)− p?(t, x1(t))− ∂p?∂x (t, x1(t))(1− x1(t))
∆.
Since p?(t, ·) is convex, we have that q is non-increasing, p?(t, ·) + εq(t, ·) is non-decreasing for ε ∼ 0 and p(t, 1) +
q(t, 1) = p(t, 1)−∆. Therefore p? + εq ∈ C+(a, b) for ε ∼ 0 so Ψ′(p?; q) ≤ 0. Since
Ψ′(p?; q) =
∫
T+1
∫ 1
x1(t)
− ∂q
∂x
(t, x)µt dx dt,
we conclude that the set T+1 has Lebesgue measure equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 6.6. We show that under the conditions of the proposition, P ? ≡ H over some subset of
(0, a0] ∪ [b0, 1) with positive Lebesgue measure and the result follows from Proposition 6.1. Suppose not, then for
almost every t ∈ [0, T ] we have
∂p?
∂x
(t, x) =

(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)
]+
f(x)∂K∂c (t, A(t, a0, b0))
) γ
1−γ
g′γ(x)
γ
, x ∈ (0, b0),
(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)− g′γ(x)
]+
f(x)∂K∂c (t, A(t, a0, b0))
) γ
1−γ
g′γ(x)
γ
, x ∈ (a0, 1).
Thus either ∂P
?
∂x (a0) > H
′(a0) or ∂P
?
∂x (b0) < H
′(b0), which contradicts that Xˆ?(p?) = [0, b0) ∪ (a0, 1].
Proof of Theorem 6.3. First of all, we recall that we have a degree of freedom in choosing the map p˜ to which p
is equal on [b?0, a?0], since it does not play any role in criterion that p? maximises. Of course, if we want to be able to
conclude, this map has to be u−convex in the end. Therefore, if we can choose it so that p? is C1 and convex in x,
we can apply Lemma C.1 and conclude that p? is indeed u−convex. This can be made if and only if the derivative
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of p? at a?0 is greater or equal to the derivative of p? at b?0, which can be shown immediately to be equivalent to,
regardless of the value of γ,
a?0 −
1
2
≥ b?0.
Furthermore, if this is not satisfied, then p? is not convex, and we can apply the second part of Lemma C.1 to
conclude that p? is not u−convex.
We now divide the proof in two steps.
• Case (i): γ ∈ (0, 1).
Given the discussion above, in this case the only thing we have to do is to compute p. Denote for simplicity
Lγ(t) :=
(
γNγ
(1− γ)φ(t)
) 1
γ
.
We know that the map x 7−→ xφ(t)cγ/γ − p?(t, x) is concave on [0, 1]. Notice as well that since a?0 > 1/2, we have
1/2 ≥ a?0 − 1/2 ≥ b?0. We can then compute its maximum and obtain directly that it is attained at
x?(c) :=

1, if c > Lγ(t)2−
1
1−γ ,
1
2
+ Lγ(t)
γ−1c1−γ , if Lγ(t)
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
< c ≤ Lγ(t)2− 11−γ ,
x˜?(c), if Lγ(t)(b?0)
1
1−γ < c ≤ Lγ(t)
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
,
Lγ(t)
γ−1c1−γ , if 0 ≤ c ≤ Lγ(t)(b?0)
1
1−γ ,
where x˜?(c) is any point in [b?0, a?0] such that
∂p˜?
∂x
(t, x˜?(c)) = φ(t)
cγ
γ
.
We deduce that
p(t, c) =

φ(t)
cγ
γ
−Nγ
(
2−
1
1−γ −
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
)
− H(a
?
0)
T
, if c > Lγ(t)2−
1
1−γ ,
φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+ φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
− H(a
?
0)
T
, if Lγ(t)
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
< c ≤ Lγ(t)
2
1
1−γ
,
x˜?(c)φ(t)
cγ
γ
− p˜?(t, x˜(c)), if Lγ(t)(b?0)
1
1−γ < c ≤ Lγ(t)
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
,
φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c− H(b?0)T +Nγ(b?0)
1
1−γ , if 0 ≤ c ≤ Lγ(t)(b?0)
1
1−γ .
As in the case H constant, it can easily be shown that the following simpler tariff is also admissible and produce the
same results as no consumer selects c > Lγ(t)2−
1
1−γ :
p(t, c) =

φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+ φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
− H(a
?
0)
T
, if Lγ(t)
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
< c,
x˜?(c)φ(t)
cγ
γ
− p˜?(t, x˜(c)), if Lγ(t)(b?0)
1
1−γ < c ≤ Lγ(t)
(
a?0 −
1
2
) 1
1−γ
,
φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c− H(b?0)T +Nγ(b?0)
1
1−γ , if 0 ≤ c ≤ Lγ(t)(b?0)
1
1−γ .
• Case (ii): γ < 0. As in the previous case, our assumptions imply that a?0 ≥ 1/2 and 1/2 ≥ a?0 − 1/2 ≥ b?0.
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We can then prove that the maximum of the map x 7−→ xφ(t)cγ/γ − p?(t, x) is attained at
x?(c) :=

1− Lγ(t)γ−1c1−γ , if 0 < c ≤ Lγ(t)(1− a?0)
1
1−γ ,
x˜?(c), if Lγ(t)(1− a?0)
1
1−γ < c ≤ Lγ(t)
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
,
1
2
− Lγ(t)γ−1c1−γ , if Lγ(t)
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
< c ≤ Lγ(t)2− 11−γ ,
0, if c > Lγ(t)2−
1
1−γ ,
where x˜?(c) is any point in [b?0, a?0] such that
∂p˜?
∂x
(t, x˜?(c)) = φ(t)
cγ
γ
.
We deduce that
p(t, c) =

φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ(1− a?0)
1
1−γ − H(a
?
0)
T
, if 0 < c ≤ Lγ(t)(1− a?0)
1
1−γ ,
x˜?(c)φ(t)
cγ
γ
− p˜?(t, x˜(c)), if Lγ(t)(1− a?0)
1
1−γ < c ≤ Lγ(t)
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
,
φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+ φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
− H(b
?
0)
T
, if Lγ(t)
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
< c ≤ Lγ(t)
2
1
1−γ
,
φ(t)
cγ
γ
+Nγ
((
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
− 2− 11−γ
)
− H(b
?
0)
T
, if c > Lγ(t)2−
1
1−γ .
As previously, it can easily be shown that the following simpler tariff is also admissible and produce the same results
as no consumer selects c > Lγ(t)2−
1
1−γ :
p(t, c) =

φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ(1− a?0)
1
1−γ − H(a
?
0)
T
, if 0 < c ≤ Lγ(t)(1− a?0)
1
1−γ ,
x˜?(c)φ(t)
cγ
γ
− p˜?(t, x˜(c)), if Lγ(t)(1− a?0)
1
1−γ < c ≤ Lγ(t)
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
,
φ(t)
cγ
2γ
+ φ(t)Lγ(t)
γ−1c+Nγ
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
− H(b
?
0)
T
, if Lγ(t)
(
1
2
− b?0
) 1
1−γ
< c.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 6.1
We give here a series of result which once combined prove Theorem 6.1. To simplify the statements, we give them in
a generic set (an, bn), the generalisation being straightforward. The first proposition shows that the existence of the
interval I in the theorem allows us to localise Problem (Pa,b), and replace it by a simpler one, in which the constraint
P ?(x) ≥ H(x) for every x ∈ X?(a, b) can be ignored.
Proposition D.1. Let p? be a solution of (Pa,b) and suppose there exists x1 ∈ (an, bn) such that P ?(x1) > H(x1).
Then, there exists x0 ∈ (an, bn), x0 < x1, such that p? is solution to the following problem
(Px0,x1) sup
q∈C(x0,x1)
Ψx0,x1,p
?
(a,b) (q), (D.2)
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where
Ψx0,x1,p
?
(a,b) (q) :=
∫ T
0
∫ x1
x0
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)
g′γ(x)
∂q
∂x
(t, x)dxdt
−
∫ T
0
K
(
t,
∫ x1
x0
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂q
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx+ Ix0,x1(a,b) (p
?)
)
dt,
Ix0,x1(a,b) (p
?) :=
∫
X?(a,b)\(x0,x1)
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1
γ
f(x)dx,
and C(x0, x1) denotes the set of maps q ∈W 1,mx (x0, x1) such that
• x 7−→ q(t, x) is continuous and increasing for every t ∈ [0, T ] \ N (q).
• p?(t, x0) +
∫ x1
x0
∂q
∂x
(t, x) dx = p?(t, x1) for every t ∈ [0, T ] \ N (q).
Proof. Define
x0 := inf {z ∈ X?(a, b), P ?(x) ≥ H(x1) for every x ∈ [z, x1]} .
By continuity we have that x0 < x1 and P ?(x0) = H(x1). Notice that the restriction of p? to the set [x0, x1]
belongs to C(x0, x1). Suppose the restriction is not a solution of (Px0,x1), then there exists q? ∈ C(x0, x1) such that
Ψx0,x1,p
?
(a,b) (q
?) > Ψx0,x1,p
?
(a,b) (p
?). Define then p¯ : [0, T ]× [0, 1] −→ R by
p¯(t, x) :=
p
?(t, x), x 6∈ [x0, x1],
p?(t, x0) +
∫ x
x0
∂q?
∂x
(t, x)dx, x ∈ (x0, x1).
Then, for every x ∈ [x0, x1] ∫ T
0
p¯(t, x)dt ≥
∫ T
0
p¯(t, x0)dt ≥ H(x1) ≥ H(x),
and it is straightforward that p¯ ∈ C+(a, b). This is a contradiction with the optimality of p? in problem (Pa,b)
because
Ψ(a,b)(p¯) = Ψ(a,b)(p
?)−Ψx0,x1,p?(a,b) (p?) + Ψx0,x1,p
?
(a,b) (q
?).
Now we state the optimality conditions for the problem (Px0,x1).
Proposition D.2. Let p? be a solution of (Px0,x1) with x0, x1 as in Proposition D.1. Then there exists a null set
N ⊂ [0, T ] and a constant µt for every t ∈ [0, T ] \ N such that for every x ∈ (x0, x1)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x) =
(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x) + g
′
γ(x)µt
]+
f(x)∂K∂c (t, A(t, a, b))
) γ
1−γ
g′γ(x)
γ
. (D.3)
Proof. Notice that the set C(x0, x1) can be written as
C(x0, x1) =
{
q ∈W 1,mx (x0, x1), g(q) ∈ C, h(q) = 0
}
,
where g : W 1,mx (x0, x1) −→ Lm([0, T ] × [x0, x1]) is defined by g(q) = ∂q∂x , where C is the following convex cone
C := {q ∈ Lm([0, T ]× [x0, x1]), q(t, x) ≥ 0, a.e.} and h : W 1,mx (x0, x1) −→ Lm([0, T ]) is defined by
h(q) :=
∫ x1
x0
∂q
∂x
(·, x)dx+ p?(·, x0)− p?(·, x1).
It can be checked in the same way as in Remark 5 from [8], that their Assumption S is satisfied in this context.
Furthermore, it is a classical result that the dual of W 1,mx (x0, x1) is W
1,m/(m−1)
x (x0, x1).
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Define now the Lagrangian L : W 1,mx (x0, x1)×W 1,m/(m−1)x (x0, x1)× L
m
m−1 (0, T ) −→ R by
L(q, λ, µ) := Ψx0,x1,p
?
(a,b) (q) +
∫ T
0
∫ x1
x0
λ(t, x)
∂q
∂x
(t, x)dxdt
+
∫ T
0
µ(t)
(∫ x1
x0
∂q
∂x
(t, x)dx+ p?(t, x0)− p?(t, x1)
)
dt.
Then, from Corollary 2 in [10] it follows that there exists λ ∈W 1,m/(m−1)x (x0, x1), µ ∈ Lm(0, T ) such that
0 =
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)
g′γ(x)
− 1
γ
(
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)
) 1−γ
γ
(
γ
φ(t)g′γ(x)
) 1
γ
f(x)
∂K
∂c
(t, A(t, a, b))
+µ(t) + λ(t, x), a.e. in [0, T ]× [x0, x1],
λ(t, x)
∂p?
∂x
(t, x) = 0, λ(t, x) ≥ 0, a.e. in [0, T ]× [x0, x1].
Then, when ∂p
?
∂x (t, x) > 0 we have that λ(t, x) = 0 and
∂p?
∂x
(t, x) =
(
φ(t)
1
γ
[
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x) + g
′
γ(x)µ(t)
]
f(x)∂K∂c (t, A(t, a, b))
) γ
1−γ
g′γ(x)
γ
.
In case ∂p
?
∂x (t, x) = 0 we have that
gγ(x)f(x) + g
′
γ(x)F (x)
g′γ(x)
+ µ(t) = −λ(t, x) ≤ 0,
which ends the proof.
We prove finally that the map µ does not depend on x0, x1 and is the same in the interval I = (x`, xr).
Proposition D.3. Let I = (x`, xr) ⊂ (an, bn) be as in Theorem 6.1. Then for any x0, x1 ∈ I, there exist a null set
N ⊂ [0, T ] and a constant µt for every t ∈ [0, T ] \ N such that for every x ∈ (x0, x1) (6.7) is satisfied.
Proof. Let y0 := x1 and define by induction for k ≥ 0
zk := inf{z ∈ (an, bn), P ?(x) ≥ H(yk), ∀x ∈ [z, yk]}, yk+1 := zk + yk
2
.
By continuity we have that P ?(zk) = H(yk), so yk+1 < yk and the sequence (yk)k converges necessarily to an. We
conclude by applying Proposition D.2 to every interval (zk, yk) and noting that these intervals overlap themselves.
D.3 Other proofs
Proof of Proposition 6.3.
From Assumption 6.1 and Theorem 6.1 we have that on every interval I over which P ? > H, there exists a null set
N ⊂ [0, T ] such that for every t ∈ [0, T ] \ N , x 7−→ ∂p?∂x (t, x) is non-decreasing on I. Therefore P ? is convex on I
since
∂P ?
∂x
(x) =
∫ T
0
∂p?
∂x
(t, x)dt.
Proof of Proposition 6.4. Let p? be the solution of problem (Pa,b). We will prove that P ? ≡ H in the interval
(an0 , bn0) and the result will follow from Proposition 6.1. Suppose not, then there exists x0 ∈ (an0 , bn0) such that
P ?(x0) > H(x0) and p? is given by (6.6) in a neighbourhood around x0, so P ? is increasing in that neighbourhood. By
Proposition 6.3 we have that P ?(bn0) > H(bn0), because on every interval which is contained in the set {x, P ?(x) ≥
H(x)} the convex map P ? and the strictly concave map H can intersect at most at one point. This contradicts the
fact that p? ∈ C+(a, b).
39
